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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Reason for 'the Thesis
With the invention of modern tools of communication, the
distances has been shortened between different countries in
the world, and the interactions among them are greatly
increased. Undoubtedly, the communication of international
economic activities is one of the most significant
influences. The problems caused by trusts provide a good
example. After the appearance of cartels in Europe and
trusts in America, the countries of Asia also found the same
problem and sought their own ways to solve it. Now, Taiwan,
the Republic of China, has encountered such problems too.
In an attempt to solve the problems, Taiwan is enacting
an antitrust statute - the Fair Trade Law.1 Due to the
similarity of human economic activities throughout, the
experience of the advanced countries would be helpful to the
legislature of Taiwan when they consider enacting such an
antitrust law. The United States is one of the advanced
country whose antitrust regulation has been referred by
Taiwan's Fair Trade Law draft. This thesis is an attempt to
make comments and suggestions for improving the draft Fair
Trade Law in Taiwan by referring to the regulations and case
experience of the antitrust laws in the U. S.
1
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B. Legisla~ive Background of Enac~ing ~he Draf~ FTL
In the last forty years Taiwan's economy has changed
rapidly from a simple agricultural system to a complex and
varied industrial-commercial economy. Because of these
tremendous changes in economic circumstances, the old laws
regulating economic activity are unable to regulate the
modern economic activities in the society.2 Due to a lack of
good regulation, economic activity has been uncontrolable
during this time of economic changes. Many monopolies and
oligopolies have formed. According to a recent study,
fourteen industries in Taiwan have a market concentration
rate over ninety percent, and many competing businesses
engage in anticompetitive practices such as price-fixing and
output restrictions.3 There arise many serious economic and
social problems in the society. As a result, benefits to
consumers, allocation of social resources, and the economy
of the nation have been seriously damaged.
At the present time, the only current statute regulating
such monopolistic practices is the Administrative Act for
Agriculture, Mining, Industry and Commerce in the State of
Emergency. The act was enacted in 1938, and its only
regulation of antitrust practices is to prohibit actions
which monopolize or control the market in a few designated
goods and enterprises.4 This regulatory law is based on the
older economic system and are unable to deal with the
problems growing out of the new economy. consequently, many
monopolies have escaped regulation and punishment. Hence,
3
the outdated antitrust law facilitates the growth of
monopolies in Taiwan.
Dissatisfaction with the antitrust protection of the
current statute and the poor enforcement of the statute led
to legislative consideration of the FTL. By enacting the
draft FTL, the government seeks to expand the scope of the
current antitrust statute and also to provide better
regulation and stricter sanctions against anticompetitive
acts, thereby reconstructing the order of economic society
in Taiwan.5
c. The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter I, the introduction of this thesis, describes the
enactment and legislative background of the Fair Trade Law
in Taiwan. It also explores the purpose of the thesis -
making suggestions for improvement of the draft FTL by
referring to U. S. antitrust laws. Chapter II gives a
general picture of the respective antitrust laws of Taiwan
and the U. S. The significant contents of the antitrust law
are examined in the next four chapters: monopoly and
oligopoly in Chapter III; mergers and combinations in
Chapter IV; concerted actions in Chapter V and Chapter VI.
These four chapters share a similar structure: First the
relevant FTL regulation is described and criticized, then
the proposed alternatives are described and examined, and
finally the proposal for improvement of the FTL is made. At
last, Chapter VII is the conclusion.
4
ENDNOTES
1. The Fair Trade Law (the FTL) in Taiwan was firstly
drafted in March, 1985. On May 15, 1986, the revised FTL
Draft was submitted to the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan. This
FTL Draft was made by referring to similar legislations of
the United States, West Germany, Japan, and Korea. See the
Draft Fair Trade Law (1986); see also, Liu, The Draft Fair
Trade Law Was Adopted by Taiwan, East Asian Executive
Reports, 8 (July 1986)
2. Most scholars in Taiwan hold the same opinion. See Wu,
An Analysis of the Draft Fair Trade Law, 9 Taiwan Economic
Research Monthly, 6 June 1986, at 45; Liou, Comments and
Suqqestions for the Draft Fair Trade Law, 15 National Taiwan
Univ. L.J. 1, Jan. 1986, at 70; Yen, A Review and
Suqqestions for the Drfat Fair Law, Report of Executive Yuan
Economy Revolution Commitee, June 1985, at 124.
3. This statistics was provided by the Industy Department,
according to the statistics report of the major industrial
products in 1982. See Wu, An Analysis of the Draft Fair
Trade Law, 9 Taiwan Economic Research Monthly, 6, June 1986,
at 45.
4. See Administration Act of Agriculture, Mining, Industry
and Commerce in the State of Emergency, Art. 12 (1983)
5. See the Draft Fair Trade Law (1986) [hereinafter the
draft FTL]
II. THE ANTITRUST STATUTES IN TAIWAN AND THE U.S.
A. The Antitrust Statutes in Taiwan
1. The original Antitrust Statute
The first and only legislation in Taiwan relating
monopolistic practice is the Administration Act of
Agriculture, Mining, Industry and Commerce in the State of
Emergency, which was enacted in 1938. The only regulation
dealing with monopolistic practice in the statute is
provided in Article 12: "people who produce or operate the
designated goods or enterprises must not take such actions
that monopolize or control the market." Such terms as "to
monopolize" and "to control the market" are too ambiguous to
be applicable legal terms. The difficulty thus occurs when
applying such ambiguously worded requirements to today's
complicated business practices. Hardly any enterprises
have been held to be monopolies because there has been no
objective standard for monopolistic practices.1 In addition,
the applicable scope of the statute is too limited. The
limited application of the statute to the few designated
goods and enterprises makes the statute too restricted to
regulate many other products and enterprises.
As Professor Liou, one of the scholars who proposed the
draft FTL, pointed out, there are two major weaknesses in
5
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the original statute.2 First, the application has been
limited to the certain few designated goods and enterprises.
Second, the statute prohibits all kinds of monopolies,
including reasonable and necessary ones. In judicial
practice, such weaknesses make the court hesitant to apply
the original statute to monopolistic practices. Thus, the
outdated antitrust law facilitates the growth of
monopolistic practices in Taiwan.
For many years, legal scholars urged the government of
Taiwan to reform or replace the antitrust law. In 1980's
the government responded with the Fair Trade Law, which was
designed to replace the original antitrust statute of 1938.
2. The Draft Fair Trade Law
The draft of new antitrust statute - the draft Fair Trade
Law was formally adopted on May 15 1986 by the Executive
Yuan of the Republic of China.3 After being submitted to the
Legislative Yuan, the draft FTL has been the subject of
arguments and debate. Many think that critiques by
scholars, authorities and representatives from the
industrial and commercial fields have caused this
legislative delay.
The draft FTL incorporates two major legal sections:
antitrust law and unfair competition law. The draft FTL
governs monopolies, oligopolies, monopolization, mergers and
combinations, concerted actions impairing free competition,
and exclusionary vertical restraints. It also prohibits
7
certain types of unfair competition. Since this research is
focused on a comparison of antitrust laws of Taiwan and the
U.S., the section on unfair competition will not be
discussed.
Monopoly, mergers and combinations, and concerted actions
are the major contents of Taiwan's antitrust law.
Monopolistic structure is allowed in Taiwan; whereas
monopolistic conduct is prohibited.4 Such a monopoly policy
results from the specific economic style of Taiwan. The
country's economy relies mostly on import-export trading.
In order to raise competitive competence of this country in
the international market, the existence of certain
reasonable monopolies in structure is necessary.5
Mergers and combinations are not strictly prohibited.
Those who intended to engage in merger and combinations are
required to apply for approval in advance.6 Applicants are
judged on the basis of a reasonable standard by the
government's Fair Trade Commission.7
Concerted actions are generally prohibited, but may be
permitted exceptionally.8 The parties involved in concerted
actions may apply for permission from the authority.
permission will be granted when the concerted actions have a
justifiable purpose, such as efficiency or promotion of
competitive competence.
There are both criminal and civil penalties for violation
of the FTL. The criminal penalties includes imprisonment
not exceeding three years and fines not exceeding one
8
hundred thousand N. T. Dollars.9 The civil penalty allows a
request of treble damage from the victim.10 The enforcer of
the FTL would be a new agency, the Fair Trade Commission
("FTC"), which would be established within the Ministry of
Economic Affairs ("MOEA"). The FTC is to be in charge of
the antitrust practices in the nation. It has the power to
investigate possible violations and the power to impose
administrative sanctions.11
In presenting the draft FTL, the government of Taiwan
intended to promote a good and healthy economic society in
which the order of transactions is maintained and free
competition is secured. With such efforts, Taiwan is trying
to reach the goals of economic liberalization and
internationalization. 12
B. The Antitrust Statutes in the U. S.
Since the major reference for reviewing Taiwan's FTL
draft in this research is the U. S. antitrust laws, a
general picture of the U. S. antitrust would be introduced.
The U. S. antitrust law is rooted in the common law
tradition. It can be traced from common law actions which
were developed to limit restraints on trades and to
proscribe monopoly power and middleman profits.13 There were
two factors leading to enactment of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890 - the first antitrust law.14 One was people's
dissatisfaction with the antitrust protection provided by
the common law; the other was rising concern over the
9
effects of abusive practices by corporate giants at that
time. The Sherman Act was enacted to restrict the expanding
power of the railroads and trusts. unfortunately, it failed
and did not meet public expectation. When the antitrust
issue became a hot topic of the 1912 presidential election,
Congress passed the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts in 1914 to supplement the original Sherman Act.15
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the basic and the
most important antitrust legislation in the u.S. Most
substantive antitrust laws derive from the concepts and the
theories contained in Section 1 and 2 of the Act. Section 1
of the Act declares contracts, combinations and conspiracies
in restraint of trade to be illegal. Section 2 forbids
monopolization, combinations or conspiracies to monopolize
and attempts to monopolize. Any violation of the two
Sections are punishable by a fine not exceeding $50,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
The Clayton Act was passed in 1914, twenty years after
the Sherman Act. It specifies offenses more precisely.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which is amended by the
Robinson - Patman Act of 1936, forbids discrimination in
prices and services which substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. Tying arrangements,
requirements contracts and other exclusive arrangements are
prohibited by Section 3. Mergers by stock and asset
acquisitions which may substantially lessen competition are
prohibited by Section 7.
10
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 created the
Federal Trade Commission, an independent administrative
agency, to enforce the antitrust laws. The commission is
authorized to declare unfair methods of competition
unlawful, and to issue orders prohibiting such unfair
competition. A violation of a final order of the commission
will be subject to judicial review.
These antitrust laws were designed to control the
exercise of private economic power by preventing and
punishing monopoly. The economic goal of the antitrust law
is to promote competition and to efficiently allocate social
resources by prohibiting monopoly and restraints upon
freedom of trade. In addition, the antitrust laws also
serve non-economic goals such as decentralization of
economic power, promotion of equality of business
opportunity, and, most important, reduction of private
economic power to protect public consumer welfare.
After nearly fifty years of experience, the U. s.
antitrust law is functioning well though not entirely
satisfactorily. The discussion of the Draft FTL in more
detail and comparisons with the U. s. law will be given in
the following chapters.
ENDNOTES 11
1. See Liou, Comments and Suaaestions for the Draft Fair
Trade Law, at 2, 1987, (an article presented in the hearing
for the Fair Trade Law)
2. See ide
3. The texts of the Draft Fair Trade Law [hereinafter Draft
FTL] appear in Appendix I
4. Draft FTL, Art. 10 (1986)
5. Id. Explanation for Art. 10.
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A. Monopoly and Oligopoly in 'the Draf't FTL
1. Monopoly in the Draft FTL
Article 5 of the draft FTL defines a monopoly as a
condition wherein an enterprise does not face competition,
or has such superior market power as to exclude competition
in a particular market.1 The term "enterprise" includes
companies, sole proprietorships, partnerships, and other
persons and groups engaged in the sale of goods and
services. 2 The regulation on monopoly is provided in Article
10 of the draft FTL, where it prohibits a monopolistic
enterprise from unfairly excluding others and from
requesting favored treatment unjustifiably.3 Such regulation
is intended to show that monopoly power is not objectionable
per se, and only the exercise of monopoly power is
objectionable and punishable.
Such a policy consideration, which prohibits monopolistic
conduct but allows monopolies in structure, results from the
specific economic structure of Taiwan.4 Taiwan's economic
development relies mostly on export - import trading. To
raise the competitive competence in the international
market, large scale enterprises are not only allowable but
necessary. Mass production has been strongly promoted
12
III. MONOPOLYAND OLIGOPOLY
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throughout in the international economy for many years to
save costs and to promote efficiency.5 Hence the large scale
enterprises formed by monopolies are not necessarily
damaging the economic fabric of Taiwan. Accordingly,
monopoly in structure is both justifiable and helpful in
Taiwan as long as the enterprises are not engaging in
monopolistic conducts which restrains free market
competition. This is the major reason for such a monopoly
policy consideration in Taiwan.
In addition, monopolies are not all objectionable per see
There are some monopolies formed naturally, which are
helpful rather than harmful to society, for example, those
formed by the high quality of their services or products and
by new inventions or high technology.6 To promote efficiency
and to encourage new invention and development of high
technology, such monopolies are not be objectionable.
However, monopoly regulation in the draft FTL has been
criticized in two ways.7 First, there are no criteria to
determine whether or not a certain enterprise constitutes a
monopoly. Although Article (5) of the draft describes the
condition of monopoly, it does not give a definition for
purpose of legal judgment. The conditions for monopoly in
Article 5 are lack of competition and market power strong
enough to exclude competition. However Article (5) fails to
provide any objective criteria for determining such
practical questions as how much market power is enough to
exclude competition and how the range of a particular market
14
should be determined.8 Since there are no criteria for
determining such conditions of monopoly, it is foreseeable
that applying such a regulation to practical cases would
cause some confusion in practice.
Second, the draft FTL provides no standards for
identifying monopolistic conduct. The monopolistic conduct
prohibited by Article (10) are those which unfairly exclude
others and unjustifiably request favored treatment. The
terms "unfairly" and "unjustifiably" are too ambiguous to be
legal terms which can be enforced in practices.9 Except for
Article 10 there is no regulation providing any standard for
identifying monopolistic conduct. Thus there is a lack of
standard for identifying monopolistic conduct. In order to
define such ambiguous legal terms, to provide appropriate
criteria and standards, and thus to incorporate the draft
FTL, some scholars are seeking varied proposals by referring
to different foreign jurisdictions. The u.S. antitrust law
is one of the major concerns.
2. Oligopoly in the Draft FTL
Oligopoly is regulated in Article 5 (2) of the draft
FTL. This Article provides:
When two or more enterprises do not in fact
compete with each other in pricing and their
relationships as a whole with other entities have
the characteristics as specified in the preceding
paragraph, such situation should be deemed a
monopoly. 10
15
Oligopoly is defined as a condition wherein the
oligopolistic firms as a whole create a monopolistic
condition and do not engage in price competition among
themselves and will be treated as though they were
monopolies. Therefore, the regulations of monopoly can also
be applied to oligopoly.
B. Proposals to Incorporate Monopoly Regulation in
the Draft FTL
As stated above, there are two major weaknesses in the
draft FTL's monopoly regulation proposals: failure to define
a market and to provide criteria to measure market power,
and a lack of reasonable standards for determining
monopolistic conduct. These weaknesses led to the
consideration of some proposals to improve the new antitrust
statute.
Professor Yen, who has taught in the National Central
University, is a specialist in finance and economics. He
has proposed a solution for such problems. He indicates the
necessity of providing further regulations on these
ambiguous definitions and legal standards; while suggesting
that they should be left to the judgment of the court with
their accumulated case law experiences.II Because this
proposal leaves the responsibility to the court instead of
the legislature, it is both risky and unrealistic.
The proposal is risky because normally not all judges
have a specialized knowledge of economics, especially in the
16
field of antitrust practices which involves many complicated
marketing and corporation concepts. Due to the influence
that large-scale enterprises may have on the national
economy, an judgment to prohibit or punish a monopoly may
cause irreparable damage to the society. Hence with such a
potentially significant effect on the social economy, it is
too risky to leave such gaps to the judicial branch when
they can be filled in with better regulations by the
legislature.
In addition, imposing the burden of creating new
antitrust law upon judges is unrealistic. Under the
continental legal system, judges are bound by the statutes
made by the legislature. They are not allowed to decide
cases by their own beliefs and judgments unless such beliefs
and judgments are confirm to the law. Thus, to expect
judges to make new laws without proper underlying laws is
too unrealistic to be executed.
Therefore, leaving these gaps in the draft FTL and
expecting the courts to fill them in makes the statute too
risky and unrealistic to be a good law. From the
legislative standpoint, it would be better to improve the
draft FTL than to leave these gaps to be filled in by the
courts. In fact, this is the reason that scholars are eager
to study legislative and judicial experiences of other
advanced countries that may fill these gaps and be
incorporated into the draft FTL.
17
It is possibly that the executive branch intended for the
courts to fill these gaps while the FTL was drafted. If
this is true, the advanced experiences of other countries
become even more important. Because by referring to others'
experiences, the courts in Taiwan may avoid the weaknesses
and incorporate strong points into the draft FTL.
1. Monopoly Power
When dealing with the problem of monopoly power,
professor Liou suggests a solution based on West German
antitrust law. Considering the variety of factors affecting
the definition of markets and the difficulties of
determining the measurement of monopoly power, he suggests a
West German approach to solving the problem of monopoly
power.
According to professor Liou, there are a variety of
factors which determine whether a firm possesses monopoly
power, a power which is strong enough to control prices or
exclude other competitors from the market.12 First, the
market must be appropriately defined before monopoly power
can be measured. Several factors must be carefully
considered when defining a market, including the
availability of substitutes for a product, distance and
transportation factors affecting equivalent products, and
the analysis of the market structure. Second, a firm's
marketing conduct is also an important consideration when
determining monopoly power of a firm, especially when the
18
firm can freely decide its own strategy of operation and
disregard other competitors' reactions in the market.
Due to such a variety of factors affecting the market and
the difficulties of measuring monopoly power, professor Liou
has proposed that an enterprise which possesses one third
share or more of a particular market will be presumed to be
a existing or potential monopoly.13 Similarly, any three
enterprises which together control half of a particular
market, or any five enterprises which together control two
thirds of a particular market be presumed an oligopoly.14
By proposing to measure a firm's monopoly power by its
market share, Professor Liou has attempted to simplify the
practical difficulties of determining a monopoly by
objective criteria.
Another significant proposal, which has been supported by
several legal scholars, refers to the U. S. antitrust laws.15
In order to study this proposal, details of the U. S.
antitrust laws and case experience will be given below.
In the U. S., monopoly power has been defined as power to
control price or to exclude competition from the market.16
When a firm has market power which is strong enough to
affect the price or to exclude other competitors from the
market, the firm has monopoly power. The usual procedure
for dealing with the issue of whether a firm has monopoly
power is first to delineate a relevant market, then to
measure the firm's market power by its market share, and
finally to base the determination on that share.17
19
Therefore, before measuring market power, a relevant market
should first be delineated.
a. Relevant Market
A relevant market is the narrowest market in which
products from adjacent areas or from other producers in the
same area can not compete on substantial parity with those
included in the market.1S It is usually defined in product
and geographic terms.
When delineating a product market, the availability of
homogeneous and substitutable products are major factors to
be considered.19 Whether the homogeneous or substitutable
products in the market should be included must be first
determined.
In the landmark case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,20 the defendant Alcoa, the only domestic producer of
virgin aluminum ingot, was charged with monopoly in the
production of virgin aluminum ingot.21 In this case, the
issue of the product market involved homogeneous products:
the virgin aluminum ingot sold, the virgin aluminum ingot
fabricated by Alcoa itself, and the secondary ingot made by
recycling scrapped aluminum fabrications, which was produced
by other traders.
The court delineated the product market by including the
ingot Alcoa sold and the ingot it produced and fabricated
but excluding the secondary ingot. The court reasoned that
Alcoa's fabricating activities caused a reduction in demand
for ingot. Alcoa, by fabricating, displaced non-integrated
20
fabricators who would otherwise have bought Alcoa's
production. 22 Thus the ingot produced and fabricated by
Alcoa should be included. As for the secondary ingot , the
court thought that Alcoa, knowing that current production
could be reclaimed, would take into account the production's
return as scrap to compete with Alcoa's future production.
Since the secondary production was subject to Alcoa's
control in the past, it was excluded when delineating the
product market.23
In Alcoa, the court, by analyzing market demand and the
monopolist's production plan, delineated the product market
among products that were functionally and physically
similar. In another significant case, Telex Coro. v. I.B.M.
Coro.,24 the court delineated the product market of products
that are physically dissimilar though functionally
interchangeable in some uses.
In Telex, the plaintiff Telex, with other firms, made
peripheral equipment compatible with an IBM computer. IBM
reduced prices and changed its pricing method , cutting into
the profits of the defendant and others. The defendant
brought an action claiming that IBM possessed monopoly power
in both the basic computer market and in the market for
peripheral devices compatible with the IBM computer. When
delineating the product market, the court stressed the low
cost and easy technology for switching from making equipment
compatible with one manufacturer's central processing units
to making equipment compatible with those of others. Thus
21
the court defined the product market as the one including
peripheral devices compatible with IBM and those not
compatible with IBM.25
Substitutability is the other factor to be taken into
account when defining the product market. In the famous
case, United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & co.,26 the
defendant Du Pont, which produced seventy five percent of
the cellophane sold in the U. S., was charged with
monopolizing trade in that product. The court used the test
of the cross-elasticity of demand to determine whether the
products are reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes. The evidence showed that relatively small
reductions in the price of cellophane caused relatively
large numbers of buyers to switch to cellophane from other
wraps. The court inferred that there was a high cross-
elasticity of demand between cellophane and other flexible
wrapping materials, that is , the substitutability by
consumers of other flexible wrapping materials for
cellophane was great.27 On the basis of this evidence, the
court defined the market as all flexible wrapping materials,
and not cellophane alone.28
In the CelloDhane case, the court used the cross-
elasticity demand test to determine the substitutability of
the product in the market, and accordingly to delineate a
proper product market. Although the courts' reasoning in
these cases is not completely persuasive,29 the analysis of
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the cases and the rationale underlying the decision are
worthy for the courts in Taiwan to refer to.
A geographic market is a geographic area within which
sellers of a product can increase price or cut production
without causing a prompt flow of supply from sellers in
other areas.30 Geographic location is less important in
delineating a geographic market than the presence of buyers
and sellers who are in such free intercourse with one
another that the prices of the same foods tend to equality
easily and quickly.3! Hence, a central station security
alarm service, for example, can be considered local because
each station serves a 25 mile radius. Despite its limited
geographic range, the security service is affected by its
national planning, nationwide contracts and insurance rates.
As a result, the geographic market of the service was
delineated as a national one rather than a local one.32 On
the other hand, although a newspaper was distributed out of
state and its publisher engaged in considerable interstate
commerce, the geographic market was delineated as a local
market because the paper's daily newspaper monopoly covered
99 % of the local families.33
The scope of the geographic market may vary with several
factors, including transportation costs and legal
restrictions.34 A domestic producer has a transportation
cost advantage over a foreign producer. If a domestic
producer sets a price below the cost of a foreign producer,
the foreign producer will be excluded from the geographic
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market. On the contrary, if the domestic producer sets a
price at which the foreign producer can enter the market,
the geographic market will be enlarged and include the
foreign producer. Legal restrictions such as city licensing
requirements or custom duties may also influence the matter.
Being an island, Taiwan's geographic market problems are
not as complicated as those of the U. S. The geographic
market is usually both the national and regional one - the
Taiwan market, except in cases which involve an
international market. Because Taiwan's economy mainly
relies on import-export trading, a study of geographic
markets at an international level is necessary.
Alcoa is the only case in the U. S. which deals with
differentiation between a national and an international
market. 35 Alcoa produced all of the virgin aluminum ingot in
the U. S., but the court did not hold that Alcoa had 100 %
of the national market. By adding the total amount of
imported ingot sold in this country to the measuring base,
the court computed Alcoa's share at 90 %. The court
considered only the portion of foreign production which had
reached America, not all foreign production, as the relevant
foreign source to compute the market share. The court
thought that the foreign sellers had a tariff and
transportation cost disadvantage, and thus excluded foreign
competitors from being considered part of the market.
Consequently, the court defined the geographic market as
national rather than international.36
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Some scholars propose a diversion approach to geographic
market definition.37 They argue that if a foreign seller has
some sales in a market, all his sales, wherever made, should
be considered a part of that market for purposes of
computing the market share of a domestic seller. This is
because, having proved his ability to sell in the market,
the foreign sellers could increase his sales there simply by
diverting sales from other markets if the market price
should rise.
Although this proposal may be true, there are non-
economic reasons for hesitating to consider a geographic
market to be international.38 For example, there would be
potential political blocks to transnational responses within
the international market, including the tariff and a variety
of commercial barriers to international trade. Therefore, a
geographic market could hardly be defined as an
international market.
b. Market Power
Once a relevant market has been defined, measuring the
market power of a firm is the next step in determining
whether or not the firm has monopoly power in the market.
Market share is the primary basis which most courts rely on
to measure a firm's market power.39 In addition to market
share some courts also take market structure into account in
determining a firm's market power.40
The market share approach uses market share percentage to
measure a firm's market power. The underlying rationale is
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that the more market share a firm has, the greater is its
ability to control prices, particularly when it has already
had a very large market share.
The amount which courts use market share to determine
monopoly power is illustrated in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America: a ninety percent share is enough to
constitute a monopoly, sixty or sixty-four percent share is
doubtful to be enough, and thirty-three percent share is
certainly not enough.41 The court in United States v.
Grinnell CorD. further held that an eighty-seven percent
market share leaves no doubt that the defendants have
monopoly power.42 In fact, for a market share of less than
approximately seventy percent, the Supreme Court has never
affirmed a finding of monopolization against a defendant.43
However, this does not mean that a firm with a market
share of less than seventy percent could not be found
possessing monopoly power. Some courts take market
structural evidence into account in determining monopoly
power. 44 The structure of a market is characterized by a
number of factors. The presence of barriers to market entry
and the size and distribution of competitors in the market
are major factors.45 These factors influence a firm's
ability to control prices or exclude competition.
A barrier to entry has been defined as anything which
prevents outside competitors from freely entering into a
market. 46 For example, in United States v. United Shoe
Machinerv CorD.,47 the Supreme Court found that United's
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accumulated patents and its business practices constituted
barriers to entry.48 The business practices included the
policy of machinery for lease only and not for sale, the
long rental term of ten year, and free maintenance service
with the leased machinery. These barriers forced
competitors wanting to enter the market to have to either
invent around the United patents or purchase expensive
licenses. Thus,the court found that competitors in the shoe
industry suffered great barriers to entry in the form of
cost disadvantages.49 Therefore, relying not only on
defendant's seventy-five percent market share, but on the
barriers to entry it created, the court inferred defendant's
ability to control prices and held that the defendant had
monopoly power.50
The size and distribution of competitors is another
important structural consideration. If the remainder of the
market is fragmented, a firm with overwhelming market share
could control prices more easier than if the remainder of
the market is concentrated in a few firms. When the
remaining competitors are small, they are more likely to be
price takers.51 Thus, for a finding of monopoly power, each
competitor's having a small share could be more critical
than a dominant firm's having a particular market share.52
Some lower courts also support the theory that, with
appropriate structural evidence, a firm may be found to
possess monopoly power even when its market share is lower
than seventy percent.53 For example, a market share of
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approximately sixty percent, together with evidence of high
barriers to entry, may support a finding of monopoly power.54
In another case, a share of only fifty percent was
sufficient. 55
In dealing with motions to dismiss, or for summary
judgment, a number of courts are more willing to accept the
possibility of monopoly power even when market share is
low.56 For example, in Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United
Parcel service,5? the Second Circuit found improper a jury
charge to the effect that possession of a market share of
less than fifty percent fails to constitute monopoly power.
The court concluded that motions for summary judgment could
be granted only when the defendant's share is less than
fifty percent, or even somewhat above the figure, and the
record contains no significant structural evidence to show
the defendant's monopoly power.58
Moreover, in Hayden Publishina Co •• Inc. v. Cox
Broadcastina Corp.,59 the Second Circuit further clarified
its Broadway Delivery holding by indicating that the
structure of the market must be considered in determining
whether monopoly power exists, and that the burden of
demonstrating the absence of significant structural evidence
of monopoly power rests with the moving party.60
Hence, while market share has been the primary basis for
measuring monopoly power, there is a trend to take market
structure into account, because a firm may be able to
control price, despite low market share, due to the market
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structure. 61 This can be done by creating barriers to entry,
or because of the small size of competitors. It is
appropriate to consider market structural evidence in
additions to market share in determining monopoly power.
c. Suggestions for the Draft FTL
Among these proposals, Professor Yen's proposal, which
asserted that the definition of ambiguous terms and
standards should be left to judicial decisions rather than
to legislation, is both risky and unrealistic.62 Professor
Liou's proposal, which tried to solve such complicated
problems as measuring monopoly power by a criterion of one
third percentage of market share, oversimplified the
problem. 63 Measuring monopoly power on the basis of market
share percentage alone, without considering other market
factors cannot provide a good judgement of anticompetitive
and economic efficiency. In addition, holding that one
third of market share constitutes monopoly power is
unpersuasive.
Therefore, the suggested proposal for improvement of the
draft FTL would be the one that refers to the u. S.
antitrust law. First, the market should be well defined.
The term "a particular market" in Art. 5 should be replaced
by "the relevant market," and the relevant market be defined
in product and geographic terms. When defining product
market, the factors of homogeneous and substitutable
products should be taken into account.
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Next, appropriate standards for measuring monopoly power
should be provided. Criteria for measuring market power
should be added to the original ambiguous power "to exclude
competition" proposed in the article. The new trends in the
u. S. courts, which measure a firm's market power based
primarily on market share and secondarily on such market
structure factors as barriers to entry, would be a good
example for Taiwan to follow. Therefore, establishing a
certain percentage of market share pursuant to the practical
needs of Taiwan and also considering the structural factors
of the market would be an improvement for the draft FTL.
2. Monopolization
The regulation of monopolization in Taiwan's draft FTL is
provided in Article 10. It prohibits monopolistic
enterprises from engaging in three activities: unfair
exclusion of other competitors, inappropriate determination
or maintenance of prices, and unjustifiably requesting
favored treatment.64 Since Taiwan's monopoly policy allows
the existence of monopolistic enterprises and prohibits only
the conduct of monopolization, the regulation on
monopolization becomes a significant part of the draft FTL.
However, the regulation in the draft FTL has been generally
criticized to be incomplete and too restrictive because it
limits prohibited monopolistic conduct to three activities.65
Professor Yen suggested a statement of principle to
replace this article of prohibition.66 This statement would
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indicate that monopolistic enterprises are prohibited from
abusing their monopoly power, and would let the courts
decide what conduct constitutes the abuse of monopoly power.
Professor Yen's suggestion of leaving the problem of
determining monopolistic conduct to the court is
inappropriate when the legislation can provide a better
solution. 67
Further criticism came from Professor Liou, who
criticized that although the listed three activities are the
common and major types of monopolistic conduct, they can
never include all possible monopolistic conduct.68 He raises
such questions as whether the forced merger of other
enterprises by price reduction can be considered an
exclusion of competition, and whether cost reduction by
refusal to adopt new production technology can be considered
inappropriate price maintenance.69 Therefore he proposed to
add a clause of general prohibition to the original article
to the effect that monopolistic enterprises are prohibited
from abusing their monopoly power.70 As a result, all abuses
of monopoly power would be prohibited, and the three listed
activities would merely provide examples of abuses, not
definitions.
Several conduct tests for monopolization adopted by the
u.S. Supreme Court can provide a good reference. In United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,71 the court adopted a
deliberateness test to determine the monopolistic conduct of
the defendant. The court held that monopoly power thrust
31
upon the defendant does not constitute monopolization
offense; monopoly power acquired deliberately does.72 The
defendant was held to be monopolized because it had achieved
monopoly rather than being a passive beneficiary of monopoly
power. 73 Under this test, monopoly resulting from superior
skill, foresight, and industry does not violate the law, but
monopoly obtained through dishonest industrial conduct
does.74
In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Cor~.,75 Judge
Wyzanski formulated two tests for monopolistic conduct: the
exclusionary conduct test and the prima facie approach. The
exclusionary conduct test asserts that a firm is monopolized
when it obtains or maintains monopoly power by conduct which
is either predatory or exclusionary in purpose and effect.76
The predatory conduct means conduct which is not a normal
industrial response to market opportunities, but is
primarily aimed at limiting the opportunities of competitors
and driving them out of the market.77 The exclusionary
conduct further refers to conduct which tends to exclude
competition not only by utilizing existing market
opportunities, but by raising barriers to entry.78 This test
focuses on conduct which could be identified as
anticompetitive.
a. Suggestions for the Draft FTL
The prima facie approach indicates that once a firm has
monopoly power, it prima facie monopolizes ; but the firm
may escape statutory liability by proving that its monopoly
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power is attributable solely to a cause which the law does
not discourage, such as superior skill, superior product,
natural advantages,.or economic or technological
efficiency.79
Among these tests, the exclusionary conduct test appears
to be suitable to Taiwan's FTL. The exclusionary conduct
test focuses on conduct which is identified as exclusionary
and harmful in the market. It avoids the complicated
inquiries resulting from the realities of the market place.
The deliberateness test outlaws deliberate actions taken to
achieve or maintain monopoly power and justifies the passive
beneficiaries of monopoly. Since all firms are run to
maximize benefits, hardly any firm seems to be a passive
beneficiary of monopoly power. This test is close to a
statement that mere possession of monopoly power will be
unlawful.SO As for the prima facie approach, it considers
mere possession of monopoly power to be prima facie
unlawful, yet reserves for the defendant the right to prove
that the causes of its possessing such power are innocent.
This approach is too strict for Taiwan, where monopoly is
allowed as a policy consideration. Therefore, the
exclusionary test is the best test for the FTL.
A proposal for improvement of the draft FTL would clearly
include a conduct test, specifically the exclusionary test
for monopolization. Thus, the suggested proposal would be
Professor Liou's proposal, which adds to Artical 10 a
general prohibition clause prohibiting abuses of monopoly
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power should be added to Article 10. In addition, the
exclusionary test is suggested to be the standard for
determining abusive conduct. As a result, enterprises
engaging in conduct which is exclusionary in purpose and
effect, such as limiting competitors' opportunities and
driving them out of the market or raising barriers to entry
and blocking potential competitors, would be found to be
monopolized.
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IV. MERGERS AND COMBINATIONS
A. Mergers and Combina'tions in 'the Draf't FTL
A combination as defined in Article 6 of the draft FTL
contains five categories: merger, acquisition of one-third
voting stock of another enterprise, acquisition by leasing
or transfer the principal part of another enterprise's
business or property, joint operation with another
enterprise on a regular basis or operation of another
enterprise by (an arrangement of )entrustment, and direct or
indirect control of another enterprise's business operation
or personnel arrangement.1 A combination of enterprises in
the following situations are required by the draft FTL to
apply for permission to the authority in advance. First,
if, as a consequence of the merger, the market share of the
merging enterprise reaches one-third of the total market;
second, if, one of the merging enterprises has a market
share of up to one-fourth of the total market; and finally
if sales of one of the merging enterprises in the preceding
fiscal year exceeds the amount publicly announced by the
(central competent) authority.2
Applications are judged by a cost-benefit analysis; if
the benefits to the economy as a whole derived from the
merger are larger than the bad effects resulting from
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restraining of the merger, the competent authority may grant
its permission.3 A combination failing to obtain a prior
permission may incur divestiture, compulsory dissolution of
assets, cessation of business and fines.4
As a result, the merger policy in the draft FTL allows
the existence of combinations, yet requires certain highly
concentrated enterprises to apply for approval for
combinations. Such a policy consideration is based on the
characteristics of the combination which carry both good and
bad economic effects for the society.
Unlike concerted actions such as cartels, combinations of
enterprises are not intended to restrict competition in the
market. In fact, combinations provide several social
benefits. Vertical combinations may secure sources of
material or sale markets for the products; horizontal
combinations may save cost and promote efficiency and
quality; conglomerate combinations may diversify investments
and separate risks.5 Consequently, combinations provide the
social benefits of securing the channel of production and
sale, reducing costs, and promoting efficiency and
technology.
On the other hand, although combinations are not intended
to restrict competition, they may result in changes in
market structure and thus bring probable bad effects to free
competition, especially when the combination creates a high
concentration of the market.6 Therefore, a policy which
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approves a combination by balancing the resulting cost and
benefit is an appropriate principle.
Most scholars upheld the principle that grants
permissions upon a basis of cost-benefit analysis.? As
Professor Liou pointed out in his article "The Supervision
of Enterprises' Combinations in the Draft FTL," combinations
may create monopoly power, change the market structure, and
thus result in the danger of restricting free competition.
On the other hand, they may also encourage invention, reduce
costs, and thus enrich Taiwan's competitive competence in
the international market.8 Under such circumstances,
legislation which supervises combinations by evaluating
their costs and benefits from the standpoint of the economy
as a whole will be appropriate legislation.
Nevertheless, the method of supervising combinations
which requires an application for permission in advance has
been commonly criticized.9 There are two alternatives for
supervising combinations: the permission approach and the
objection approach. The permission approach requires the
combining enterprises to apply for permission prior to their
combination. The enterprises cannot combine until
permission is granted; the combination will be prohibited if
the application is denied. The objection approach requires
the combining enterprises to report their combining plan to
the authority Prior to the combination; the combination as
described in the reported plan would be legal unless the
authority objects during a certain period.
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Apparently, the FTL draft adopts the permission approach
to supervise combinations. The permission approach has been
criticized as a waste of enterprises' and government's
resources and a probable impairment of the combining
enterprises' legal rights and interests.IO As Professor Yen
indicated, the cost or benefit of a combination is hard to
estimate in advance.II Thus, under the permission approach,
if the authority postpones applications for enterprises'
combinations, the timing of the combinations and the
potential profits resulting from them would be affected, and
as a consequence, the legal rights and interests of the
combining enterprises would be impaired.12 In addition, if
all combinations are required to apply for permission, not
only do combining enterprises have to consume much time and
effort, but the government has to use many resources for
examining applications.13
From a practical view, Professor Liang also asserted that
to adopt the permission approach is to ignore the reality of
Taiwan's current economic situation and is against the
consistent government policy.14 Due to the high percentage
of middle and small sized enterprises in Taiwan and the
limited market of Taiwan, Taiwan's government has encouraged
mergers of enterprises and enlargement of enterprises'
operation scale to reduce operating costs and to enrich the
competitive competence in the international market. The
advance application for permission for large-scale
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combinations increases enterprises' burdens and is also
unrealistic to Taiwan's current economic circumstances.
Therefore, most of Taiwan's scholars upheld the FTL draft
with the principle of conditional supervision of
enterprises' combinations, which grants permissions by
balancing the social benefits and the costs of the
combinations; nevertheless they oppose the manner of
supervision, the permission approach that requires the
combining enterprises to apply for permission before their
actual combination and prohibits any combinations before the
authority grants permission. They prefer the objection
approach to the permission approach on the ground that it
will encourage combinations of middle and small sized
enterprises, promote economical efficiency, and protect the
legal rights of the combining enterprises.
As a matter of fact, mergers and combinations would take
place much more often in Taiwan than would monopolies.
Taiwan's economy is based on middle and small sized
enterprises. For their own profits and through the
government's encouragment of their mergers, these middle and
small sized enterprises will merger with each other to
reduce costs and to promote their competitive competency.
Therefore, mergers in Taiwan become increasingly
significant. Due to a lack of relevant laws or cases in
Taiwan, the development and regulations of mergers and
combinations in the u.s. will be introduced.
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B. Mergers and Combinations in the U.s.
1. The Development of Mergers and the Congress Reactions
The development of mergers in the u.s. and Congress's
reaction to them can be divided into three stages.15 The
first stage began in 1879 when the great industrial trusts
and combinations took place.16 Concerned with the great
effect which the merged industrial giants had brought on the
national economy, Congress enacted the first antitrust law,
the Sherman Act, to outlaw all contracts and combinations in
restraint of trade. By using the Sherman Act, the
government successfully broke up several great
consolidations in the fields of railroad, oil, and tobacco,
and thus brought an end to the first stage of mergers.
Although the Sherman Act served as a good device to
prohibit some industrial mergers in the 1890s, the
development of industry revealed a loophole in the act: a
lack of a particular regulation on stock acquisition. Such
a loophole in the Sherman Act and the flexible "rule of
reason" formulated by the Supreme Court in the oil and
tobacco cases created concern that certain trade practices
might escape regulation through the use of stock acquisition
or other methods.17 In respond to this concern, Congress
passed the Clayton Act to reinforce the Sherman Act.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act specifically outlawed a
corporation's stock acquisitions of another.
In the 1920s Congress's fear of applying the "rule of
reason" to industrial mergers came true. In the United
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States Steel case, the Supreme Court took a view that unless
a combination had achieved monopoly, the Sherman Act could
not be applied to it, even though it created a dominant firm
in the oligopolistic steel industry. As a result, a second
stage of mergers and combinations occurred during the 1920s.
In addition to the court's application of the "rule of
reason", there was another loophole in Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: a lack of regulation on assets acquisitions
also contributed to Congress's amendment of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. In United States v. Columbia Steel co.,IB the
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was not applicable
to a purchase of the assets of another corporation, even
though the purchasing company was the largest in the field.19
This started the third stage of mergers and combinations.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was amended in 1950. The
amendment eliminated the asset loophole; nevertheless it
left the problem of developing standards of illegality to
the courts and to the Federal Trade commission. Under the
amended Section 7, a merger is illegal where its effect may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.
From the development of mergers and combinations in the
U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court's efforts to protect
procompetitive mergers has been apparent. Applying the
Sherman Act by a "rule of reason", the Supreme Court made
flexible the fixed rule of the act, which prohibited all
kinds of mergers, procompetitive or anticompetitive. Then
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Congress revised their opinion on mergers and combinations
by presenting the 1950 Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. The amended Section 7 was intended not only to prevent
potential high economic concentration, but also to protect
small businesses when mergers between them would not
substantially lessen competition.
As a matter of fact, the u.S. is the only advanced nation
in the world to make mergers illegal.20 U. S. merger laws
serve the purpose of lessening, if not preventing, giant
industrial trusts which may result from mergers of large
companies. However, such a antimerger law is not suitable
to Taiwan.
Unlike the U.S., Taiwan has many middle and small sized
enterprises and few large companies. For the sake of
reducing costs and promoting quality, these middle and small
enterprises have to seek to merge with each other. For the
sake of the national economy, Taiwan's government also
encourages them to merge into large scale companies so that
Taiwan can raise its competitive competence in the
international market. As a result, a strict antimerger law
of the U.S. pattern is not suitable to Taiwan. Therefore,
the draft FTL's conditional supervision proposal on mergers
and combinations, which balances the costs and benefits each
merger may bring, is an appropriate one for Taiwan.
However, the draft FTL provides no criteria for the
authority or the court to evaluate a merger on a cost-
benefit basis. Consequently, a study of the standards for
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illegality of mergers in the u.s. and the underlying policy
considerations is necessary.
2. Standards for Illegality of Mergers and Underlying Policy
Considerations
Mergers can be basically divided into three types:
horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, and conglomerate
mergers. Horizontal mergers are mergers between firms which
compete directly, selling the same products, in the same
market. Vertical mergers are mergers between firms standing
in a supplier-customer relationship to each other.
Conglomerate mergers involve neither horizontal nor vertical
elements, and most of them are market or product extension
mergers.21
Horizontal mergers have been the main target for
antitrust regulation because they may create new market
power and affect competition in the market.22 By reducing
the number of competing firms and enlarging the market share
of the merged firm, a horizontal merger may change the
market structure and create a new market power, by which the
merged firm may lessen its competition in the market and
thus achieve the effect of monopoly. Because of such an
effect, horizontal mergers become the main target for
antitrust regulation.23
However, not all horizontal mergers will create such a
result. Some horizontal mergers benefit competition instead
of impairing it.24 For example, a horizontal merger between
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two small firms can reduce cost, promote efficiency, and
thus raise their competitive ability against other big firms
in the market. Therefore, according to the Justice
Department Merger Guidelines, a horizontal merger should be
challenged only when it creates or facilitates the exercise
of market power or actually lessens competition.25
Considering the costs and benefits which horizontal
mergers may produce, nevertheless, there are two legal
defenses available: the efficiencies defense and the
failing-firm defense.26 The primary benefit of mergers is
their probable enrichment of efficiencies, which can
increase the competitiveness of firms and result in lower
prices for consumers. As a result, the efficiencies-
enriching effect has been considered as an affirmative
defense, although they have served only as part of the legal
analysis, not as a separate defense.27 For example, in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,28 the Supreme Court indicated that
Section 7 would not bar a merger between two small firms
when the merger would enrich their competitiveness against
larger firms in the market.
The failing company defense justifies certain otherwise
illegal mergers when one of the merging companies would
probably fail if the merger is prohibited. Consequently,
merger defendants would be able to assert a failing company
defense when it is suitable.29
vertical mergers are combinations between buying firms
and selling firms in the same market. The sellers are often
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referred to as "upstream" firms; and the buyers are
"downstream" firms.3D There are two opposing views of
vertical mergers' effect on competition. The favorable view
is that vertical mergers have no anticompetitive effects in
the market. It reasons that after the merger, the number of
firms and the market share of the firms are the same as
before, thus the vertical merger leaves competitive
conditions in both the seller and buyer markets unchanged.31
On the other hand, the unfavorable view stresses that a
vertical merger changes the competitive conditions down the
distribution ladder. It argues that a vertically merged
firm will deal with its constituent units on terms more
favorable than with nonmerged competitors. The downstream
market will contain only nonmerged firms and thus become
more concentrated. Such effects can be anticompetitive.32
The Supreme Court took the unfavorable view of vertical
mergers in the 1960s.33 In the famous case, Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States,34 the Supreme court held illegal the merger
of Brown, a manufacturer with four percent of production on
the market, and Kinney, a retail shoe store with sale of
only 1.6 percent in the market. The court reasoned that the
vertical integration might foreclose competition from a
substantial share of the market for shoes.35
However, in the 1980s only mergers that might increase
entry barriers or facilitate collusion in the market would
likely be challenged.36 In Fruehauf CorD. v. FTC,37 the
Second Court indicated that the legality of a merger should
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be determined, case by case, on the merger's particular
economic and historical circumstances.38 The court then
factually distinguished this case from Brown Shoe and held
the merger lawful for its not raising entry barriers,
notwithstanding foreclosure effects.39 In fact, no cases
have been brought by either the Justice Department or the
FTC in recent years.40
Conglomerate mergers are usually defined as neither
horizontal nor vertical mergers. They do not affect the
market structure, but merely change the identity of firms
already in the market.41 Therefore, the Department's
Guidelines entirely ignore conglomerate mergers.42 However,
despite the Guidelines' silence, the court has still
challenged conglomerate mergers on three grounds: potential
competition, reciprocity, and entrenchment.43
A conglomerate merger may inhibit potential competition.
without the merger, the acquiring firm may have to enter the
field by starting a new firm or otherwise internally
expanding itself, thus entering into competition with the
acquired firm.44 Nevertheless, because a sufficient
probability of injury is hard to prove, the potential
competition alone is unlikely to provide a basis for
successful prosecutions.45
Reciprocity is also an element which the court condemned.
With its purchase power, a selling firm can force another
firm which also sells products to the selling firm to
purchase its products.46 This is so-called reciprocity. A
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conglomerate merger that creates opportunities to engage in
such reciprocity may be challenged by the court.47 The
Supreme Court indicated in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Coro.48
that the reciprocity made by such a merger is one of the
congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the
antitrust laws are aimed.49 In United States v.
International Teleohone & Telearaoh Coro.,50 the court
further provided three prerequisites to a finding of illegal
merger on reciprocity grounds: a significant increasing in
the opportunities for reciprocal dealing; a reasonable
probability that those opportunities will be exploited; and
a tendency substantially to lessen competition resulting
from the reciprocal dealing.51
Enrichment is another element which the court condemned.
By a conglomerate merger, the merged firm may become so
large that it can obtain certain cost savings, such as
buying supplies and distribution services, which are not
available to a small firm.52 For example, in FTC v. Procter
& Gamble co.,53 the merger of Procter and Clorox had enabled
the merged firm to obtain significant advertising discounts
not available to competitors. with such a cost saving,
Procter could thus increase its share in the market by price
reductions, ignoring the loss in revenue. Therefore, The
court concluded that the cost savings resulting from the
merger would have entrenched Clorox's position in its market
and increased entry barriers.54 This anticompetitive effect
is the object that antitrust laws have condemned.
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c. suggestions for the Draft FTL
The development of the u.s. merger laws, which started by
treating mergers as illegal per se, now allow the
efficiencies defense and the falling company defense,
showing a realization that mergers are not all
anticompetitive and per se illegal. Therefore, making
mergers unconditionally illegal is inappropriate. Instead,
conditional supervision, whichs require notifications of
certain large scale mergers, is a better way to regulate
mergers because it can not only avoid a waste of effort and
time-consuming investigation of procompetitive mergers of
small companies, but can also efficiently control mergers of
large companies which may lessen competition.55
Therefore, referring to the u.s. experience, the
established principle of conditional supervision in the
draft FTL, which requires certain large companies mergers to
notify the authority, will be an appropriate merger
legislation, and will be particularly suitable to Taiwan
which has many middle and small sized enterprises rather
than large scale companies. In addition, such a regulation
will also match Taiwan's government's economic policy of
encouraging mergers and combinations between middle and
small sized enterprises in order to raise Taiwan's
international competitiveness.
Approval of merger applications in the draft FTL is based
on a cost-benefit analysis; a merger will be approved if the
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benefit it brings to the society is greater than the
damage. 56 This cost-benefit analysis will allow the court
too much discretion and is too vague for enterprises to
predict and follow.57 Certain standards for approving
mergers should be established to supplement it. The
standards for illegality of mergers in the u.s. antitrust
laws and the underlying policy considerations can provide a
good reference in such areas as creating market power and
lessening competition for horizontal mergers, foreclosure
and market entry barriers for vertical mergers, and
reciprocity and entrenchment for conglomerate mergers.
Although the principle of conditional supervision of
mergers has been unanimously upheld, the manner of
conditional supervision has been commonly criticized. The
proposal adopted in the draft FTL is the permission
approach, which requires an application for permission prior
to merging. This approach was intended to save the cost of
the forced dissolution of a completed merger. Once a merger
of enterprises is declared to be illegal after the fact and
is forced to dissolve, the great cost of the dissolution
will damage not only the merged enterprises but the whole
social economy. The draft FTL adopted the permission
approach. for these considerations.58
However, there is a fear among enterprises and scholars
that, due to the inefficiency of the administrative
authority, a long period of investigation for permission
would delay the mergers, make the enterprises lose their
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petential profits, and thus not only impair enterprises'
legal interests,59 but also damage the economy as a whole.
Accordingly, some of the scholars prefer the objection
approach, which merely requires a prior notification of
merger, and after a period of time, if the authority has not
objected, the completed merger is legal. As a result, the
timing of mergers will not be affected and the profits and
legal interest of merging enterprises will not be impaired.
Since each of these two approaches has its good points
and drawbacks, further consideration is necessary to solve
the problem. The main drawback of the permission approach
is the possibility that the authority will delay permission,
thus cause damage to merging firms. Accordingly, a limited
period of time for evaluation should be expressly provided
for in the draft FTL. Thus, the main disadvantage of the
permission approach can be avoided. On the other hand,
since the economic policy of Taiwan is to encourage mergers
and combinations, if the benefit of favoring the merging
enterprises outweighs the cost of possible dissolution, the
objection approach can be a reasonable one. Therefore, two
proposals of conditional supervision of mergers and
combinations will be suggested: one is the revised
permission approach that sets a reasonable time limitation
on permitting applications under the permission approach;
the alternative is the objection approach under the
consideration that the benefit of favoring merging
enterprises would outweigh the cost of dissolution.
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V. CONCERTED ACTIONS
A. Concert.ed Act.ions in t.he Draft. FTL
Concerted actions can be divided into horizontal
concerted actions and vertical concerted actions.
Horizontal concerted actions are basically prohibited in the
draft FTL.l Nevertheless, because the anticompetitive
effects of vertical concerted actions are less harmful than
those of horizontal ones, resale price maintenance is the
only vertical concerted action regulated by the draft FTL.2
Article 14 of the draft FTL prohibits Taiwan's
enterprises from engaging in concerted actions.3 Concerted
action has been defined in the draft FTL as an action
between competing enterprises to restrict each other's
commercial activities, such as price, quantity, customers,
or territory.4 Accordingly, enterprises in Taiwan are
prohibited from engaging in horizontal concerted actions
such as horizontal price-fixing, horizontal market division,
output restrictions, and boycott.
Although cartels are basically prohibited in the draft
FTL, those which benefit the economy as a whole and are
approved by the authority can be allowed.5 Cartels can be
approved if they are found to increase efficiency, unify
standards, increase joint research and development, maintain
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the orderly export of a important commodity, or to avoid
bankruptcy. 6 Accordingly, the authority will evaluate the
applied concerted actions on a "rule of reason" basis.7 In
granting approval for cartels, the authority should
establish time limitations not exceeding three years.8 The
approvals can be extended upon enterprises' reasonable
requests.9 However, when granting such approvals, the
authority may add to the cartels conditions or restrictions,
such as requiring them to follow the publicly set price or
maintain specific quality.l0
Thus, concerted actions are basically prohibited, but
can be allowed exceptionally in the draft FTL. Such a
policy consideration is based on the thinking that although
concerted actions restricts competition in the market and
thus impair customers' interests, some concerted conducts
may benefit the economy as a whole, for example, the types
mentioned in Article 14, therefore they should not be
prohibited. 11 Since Taiwan's economic policy is to encourage
cooperation between enterprises, such a concerted actions
policy is practical to the society.
However, scholars are not satisfied with the scope and
the approval method of the excepted concerted actions.12
Professor Liou proposed to restrict prohibited concerted
actions to those which have the power to affect market
structure. 13 He reasoned that if the concerted enterprises
or concerted market share is insignificant, such practices
cannot affect the market or the prices, and thus the social
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economy and customer interests will not be impaired; on the
contrary, it may serve good purposes such as saving costs
and promoting efficiency. Therefore, the prohibited
concerted actions should be limited to those which have the
power to affect the market.14
Professor Yen and Professor Liang both made comments on
the method of approving the excepted concerted actions.15
According to them, since the government's policy is to
encourage cooperation between enterprises, to require
enterprises engaging in such forms of cooperation as
concerted actions to apply for approval in advance is to
overlook the needs of Taiwan's economic structure, and
contradicts the established government policy.16 As a
result, they suggested an objection approach to replace the
approval approach: the authority punishes the enterprises
engaging in concerted actions only when they abuse their
market power and affect markets and prices.17
Scholars fear that by adopting the approval approach, the
FTL will grant the authority (the Fair Trade Commission, or
FTC) the power to approve concerted actions without any
objective standards, thus making it difficult for
enterprises to decide on employing these concerted actions.IS
It would be very difficult for enterprises in Taiwan to
prepare a justification of their concerted practices attempt
since the FTC is likely to adopt a case by case approach
based on the "rule of reason."19 In addition, a body of
administrative precedents is to be expected when the FTC
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builds up its case load. To allay the scholars' fear of a
lack of objective standards and to help the FTC with the
initial reference of its administrative decisions, the u. S.
experience of the related practice of price-fixing,
horizontal market division, and boycotts will be introduced
below.
B. Car'tel prac'tices in 'the U. s.
1. Price Fixing
Enterprises engage in price fixing practices when they
reach any agreement among competitors which directly or
indirectly inhibits price competition.20 Since United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,21 price fixing arrangements in
purpose or effect to inhibit price competition is a per se
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and cannot be
justified.22
In Soconv-Vacuum, the defendants' oil companies intended
to raise the price of gasoline by purchasing distress
gasoline from independent refiners to prevent a depressive
effect on the market. Rejecting defendants' defense that
the aim of such a price control is to eliminate a trade evil
and to bring about fair competitive prices, the court held
that the action taken to raise the price of such commodity
constituted a violation of the Anti-trust Law irrespective
of the reasonableness of the increased price or the good
intentions of the members of the combination.23 Hereafter,
any price fixing arrangements among competitors that in
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purpose or effect, directly or indirectly inhibits price
competition is per se illegal, irrespective of its
reasonableness.
However, there are two exceptional situations which are
beyond the application of the per se rule: arrangements
affecting price by improving competition and arrangements
partially integrating some activities of two or more
producers in order to achieve economies of scale.24 In a
market which is not fully competitive, a private arrangement
might make it more competitive, which might also similarly
affect price. For example, an arrangement to standardize
products or to exchange information could make a market
function better as long as the purpose and effect of these
practices is to facilitate price comparison or competition.25
Therefore, as long as these kinds of practices would make a
market more competitive, even if affecting price, they
should be analyzed under the rule of reason, and ought not
to be illegal per se.26
The court in Chicaoo Board of Trade v. United States27
made a distinction between arrangements which affect price
in purpose and effect to impair competition and those which
promote competition. In Chicaoo Board of Trade, the
arrangement of the defendant required its few members who
traded at night to do so at the prices established on the
exchange during the day. Such an arrangement facilitated
the operation of the exchanging market, yet also fixed the
price.
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The court in this case established a test of the legality
of such price fixing arrangements. The court indicated that
the true test does not depend on whether or not the
arrangement restrains competition, but on whether the
restraint imposed merely regulates, and thereby promotes
competition, or whether it suppresses competition.28 Here,
the court did not apply the per se rule, but balanced the
negative and positive effects of the arrangement. The court
held that the restriction was not aimed at price control,
and had only an incidental effect on price.29 Therefore,
such arrangements, which aim at perfecting a market and may
have the purpose and effect of enhancing competition, ought
not to be forbidden without analysis.30
Similarly, regulatory arrangements for operating tobacco
auction warehouses and bid depositories for the building
trades also provide good examples.31 These regulations have
an effect on price formation, but arguably they aid in
perfecting the market.32 As a result, in cases involving
such regulatory arrangements, the court have rejected the
per se rule and have utilized the rule of reason to balance
the negative and positive effect these arrangements have on
the market.
For arrangements involving partially integrated functions
of producers, although they may eliminate price competition
between the participating firms, they may also achieve
significant economies of scale and thus improve economic
performance. 33 If the economic benefit which an arrangement
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brings through its integration is greater than its effect on
price competition, the arrangement ought not to be illegal
because it is promoting competition, not impairing
competition. Consequently, such integrating arrangements
should not be forbidden without rule of reason analysis.34
The rationale for applying the rule of reason instead of
the per se rule to arrangements involving integration of
functions is based on an assumption that the benefits
integration brings may be greater than the reduction it
effects in price competition.35 For instance, an integration
arrangement of two small companies may enable them to
research, produce, or distribute more economically; they may
take advantage of scale economies. If market-wide
competition is not significantly affected because of their
small share in the market, such an arrangement may not
reduce competition, and instead may improve competition with
their ability to put downward pressure on price.
Consequently, an arrangement involving a partial integration
of functions, which may achieve significant economies of
scale and inevitably resulting in a price restraint, may
escape the per se illegality as long as it does not
significantly affect market-wide price competition.36
Therefore, the determination for the legality of an
integration arrangement should be based on a full analysis
to balance the extent of impairment in competition with the
extent of benefits it may bring.
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In United States v. Sealv. Inc.,3? bedding manufacturers
established a joint subsidiary which developed mattress
specifications and adopted a trade name. The subsidiary
licensed the parent manufactures to manufacture and sell
mattresses under the brand name, but fixed the sale prices.
The Supreme Court ignored the price fixing arrangement and
held that defendant's arrangements for exclusive market
territories constituted horizontal restraints.38
Nevertheless, as the District Court's opinion, such an
arrangement which conspires with its licensees to fix and
police retail prices violated Section I of the Sherman Act
and thus was illegal per se.39 Therefore, an arrangement
involving integration of functions will be analyzed under
the rule of reason if it results in unavoidable price
fixing, but is illegal per se if it insists on avoidable
price fixing.
Generally price fixing arrangements establish a minimum
sale price to secure the profits of the participating firms,
nevertheless there is another type of price fixing
arrangement which establishes a maximum price. Despite the
probable good intent of the participating firms to hold
prices down, the court reaffirmed the decision in Soconv-
Vaccum: a combination formed in purpose and effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the
price of a commodity is illegal per se.40 In Kiefer-Stewart
v. Seagram, two distillers agreed to set a maximum resale
price for their distributors to charge. There, the court
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directly emphasized the horizontal element and held that
agreements to fix maximum resale prices of their product,
which are not less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple
the freedom of traders and thus restrain their ability to
sell as they wish.41
The decision in Kiefer-Stewart is justified and
appropriate. The maximum price arrangement appeara to hold
down prices and seems to benefit consumers; nevertheless,
there must be some self-interested grounds for the
participating firms to do so.42 According to Professor
Areed, fear of attracting new entry if prices go higher is
the most likely ground, and the suggestion that the
agreement aims at inhibiting changes in products which would
demand higher prices may serve as another ground.43
Such self-interested grounds probably impair the public
interest. For successful functioning of the price system,
prices in an industry ought to be able to respond freely and
honestly to real market demand. A maximum price arrangement
in order to avoid new entry into the market or to inhibit
product changes could ruin the function of the price system
or seriously stifle competition.44 Therefore, maximum price
arrangements are as per se illegal as minimum price ones.
2. Horizontal Market Division
A cartel involving horizontal market division means an
arrangement by which the participating firms divide
territories and allocate the business among themselves.
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Cases involving horizontal market division are usually
accompanied by price fixing practices.45 Until United States
v. Topco Associates,46 the Supreme Court made a clear
decision on pure horizontal market division practices:
horizontal territorial limitations, even though
unaccompanied by price fixing, were per se illegal
regardless their reasonableness.47
In Topco, the defendants, operators of independent
supermarket chains, formed an association adopting the Topco
brand and mark to compete with other large chains. This
association purchased products bearing this brand label from
packers, and distributed these name brand products to the
participating independents. For protecting each
independent's territory, the members were given exclusive
territories for the sale of such products, and were required
to agree to restrict such sales to a specific geographic
area.
The trial court, applying the rule of reason, concluded
that since the joint action to obtain private label
merchandise was necessary for the defendants to compete
effectively with the large chains, the arrangement was
procompetitive instead of anticompetitive, and thus the
territorial restrictions were reasonably valid.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
trial court. The reversion was not because the Supreme
Court disagreed with the trial court's analysis of the
arrangement's reasonableness, but because the congressional
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policy is to invalidate arrangements which restrict
competition, as territorial restraints surely do.48 The
Supreme Court further indicated that it is Congress which
must make such a decision to upheld such arrangements.49
The TODCO decision did not persuade scholars. Professor
Sullivan criticized the court's ignoring of the integration
characterization of the arrangement and holding it illegal
per se.50 Referring to cases involving integrating price
fixing, Professor Sullivan presumed that if the Topeo
conspirators had fixed prices, their conduct ought to be
legal under the analysis of the rule of reason.51
Thus, Professor Sullivan suggested a proposal to correct
the unreasonableness of the Topco decision. As with price
fixing, the basic guide is purpose and effect. If the goal
of the arrangement or its overriding effect is division of
market, it should be characterized as market division;
however, if it is aimed at establishing or improving market,
or involving partial integration like those in price fixing,
rule of reason analysis should be utilized.
According to Professor Sullivan, market division should
be dealt with just as is a price fixing when used to create
or improve an organized market. The court should evaluate
the affirmative and the negative consequences of the
arrangement under the rule of reason before deciding its
illegality per see As for market division involving an
integration, he asserted that if the arrangement does not
appear to affect market-wide competition (that means their
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market power cannot substantially affect the markets,) and
that the division of the market is a consequence of the
integration, the legality of the arrangement should be
determined by more fully analyzing its costs and benefits
under the rule of reason. On the other hand, if the
arrangement would substantially affect market-wide
competition, or aims to divide market by territory, the
arrangement would be illegal per se.52
3. Boycott
A boycott indicates an arrangement among a group of
concerted firms which uses their concerted buying or selling
power to ask wholesalers or retailers not to sell or buy
from their competitors, and thus seeks to protect them from
competition from nongroup member competitors.53 Such a group
boycott is unduly restrictive, and hence is forbidden by the
Sherman Act. In other words, it is illegal per se
irrespective of the reasonableness of the concerted
conduct. 54 For example, in Eastern States Retailers'
Association v. United States,55 a group of lumber retailers
engaged in a boycott action to induce retailers not to deal
with wholesalers who are listed in their periodic
circulation, the court held such an arrangement to be per se
unlawful because such a concerted action with a purpose to
coerce wholesalers form entering the retail market was
against the antitrust law per se.56
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Fashion Oriainators' Guild of America v. FTC57 has been
often cited as the case supporting the per se rule to
boycott. 58 The defendant Guild was an organization of
manufacturers which designed and manufactured women's
dresses and the textiles used in making them. To combat the
competition of other manufacturers who were copying their
designs and fabrics, the members of the Guild agreed not to
sell to retailers which dealt in garments copied from
designs of Guild members.
The court found the arrangement violated the Sherman Act
because it narrowed the outlets to which manufacturers could
sell and the sources from which retailers could buy, and
thus it subjected all retailers and manufacturers who
decline to comply with the Guild's program to an organized
boycott. 59 The defendant contended that the concerted action
was reasonable and necessary to protect members from "style
piracy." The court rejected this contention and noted that
the original creations of members were neither copyrighted
nor patented, and copying can be deemed as one type of
manufacture and sale which competed with Guild members.60
The court concluded that the purpose of the combination and
the coercion it could and did practice bring it within the
prohibition declared by the Sherman Act.61
Despite its often being cited as supporting the per se
approach to boycott, Fashion Oriainators was actually
grounded in the analysis of reasonableness.62 The opinion of
the court was reached under an analysis of the effect the
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arrangement brought to competition. When all evidences
pointed to the adverse effects on competition which the
conspiracy produced, the court accordingly condemn the
arrangement as an undue restrain.63 Another case, Klor's
Inc. v. Broadwav-Hale Stores. Inc.,64 presented a complete
support of the per se rule.
In Klor's, the plaintiff, a small appliance retailer,
sued for damages resulting from a conspiracy between its
competing retailer and leading appliance manufacturers to
boycott plaintiff. The alleged conspiracy of boycott was
not disputed, but it had not produced any anticompetitive
effect because there were hundreds of other household
appliance retailers in the trade area, and thus the
opportunities for customers to buy in a competitive market
had not been reduced.
Despite the fact that there was no market-wide effect on
competition and no public injury, the Supreme Court held
that such a boycott arrangement was illegal per se.65 The
court reasoned that some classes of restraints were by their
nature and character unduly restrictive, and hence
forbidden, and cited the decision in Fashion Oriainators to
indicate that group boycott have long been held to be in the
forbidden category.66 Here, the prohibition of boycott will
not even require an element of purpose or effect to suppress
competition.
The boycott rule formulated in Klor's, which was
completely disconnected from competition, the ultimate
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concern of the Sherman Antitrust Law, has been severely
criticized. 67 Professor Rahl asserted that a boycott rule
which is not geared to a cogent test of effect on
competition is completely unmanageable.68 Professor Chadwell
also thought that the court's rule that all concerted
refusals to deal are illegal per se is so broad that it
probably goes beyond the boundaries of antitrust policy.69
To compromise the ruling of the court, Professor Sullivan
even proposed a notion to separate explicit boycotts and
other concerted conducts which tend to have the effect of a
boycott. 70 He suggested that all explicit boycotts, in which
the participators agree not to deal with the victims, should
be barred by the per se rule since they always threaten
competitive injury and seldom promise any benefit to
competition or any benefit which cannot be achieved in less
restrictive ways. Nevertheless, other concerted actions,
which may have the foreseeable but indirect effect of
inducing others not to deal with other competitors of the
participating firms, should be characterized under the
guides of purpose and effect; they should be characterized
as a boycott and held illegal per se only when they have no
purpose or effect which may benefit competition, or where
the anticompetitive effect upon the arrangement outweighs
beneficial effects.7!
For example, the periodical in Eastern States, which did
not ask members not to deal with listed wholesalers, should
not be characterized as an explicit boycott agreement, but a
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concerted conduct tending to have the boycott effect. Thus
it should be analyzed under the rule of reason. Due to its
purpose of reducing competition and its effect of reducing
those wholesalers' trade, this concerted conduct had the
purpose and effect of a boycott, and thus was illegal.72
Similarly, the manufacturers' associations' circulation in
Cement Manufactures Protective Association v. United
States,73 which provided credit information about
contractors, though it led to some contractors not being
supplied, was not thought to be illegal per see Although
the circulation did reduce competition, the manufacturers
did not aim to barricade themselves from competition at
their own level. Therefore, the per se rule to boycotts did
not apply, and instead it was analyzed under the rule of
reason.74
c. Suggestions for the Draft FTL
The Fair Trade Law is the first antitrust law in Taiwan
and provides no objective standards for illegality of cartel
conduct, at least not initially. It is therefore reasonable
for scholars to fear that enterprises in Taiwan will
hesitate to engage in beneficial concerted actions which
have been encouraged by the government because the outcomes
of the concerted actions are difficult for them to
participate and to justify.75 To solve this problem, the U.
S. experience and the scholars' comments on it may provide a
good reference.
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The rule for horizontal concerted actions is primarily a
illegal per se rule, such as the per se rule established in
Cocony-Vacuum concerning price fixing arrangements, in Tooco
concerning concerning horizontal market division
arrangements, and in Klor's concerning boycott arrangements.
However, in some exceptional situations, these concerted
actions would be analyzed under the rule of reason and be
balanced with the benefits and reduction of competition they
may bring, such as the arrangement to facilitate the
operation of the exchanging market in Chicago Board of
Trade.
Basically it is similar to the regulation in the draft
FTL, the draft FTL also established a basically prohibited
and exceptionally approved approach to these horizontal
concerted actions. The difference is that the scope of the
justified cartel conduct in the draft FTL is larger than
that in the U. s. Antitrust Law, and that cartel conduct is
justified by the legislation, not by the court.76
In the U.S., the court could make illegal a concerted
arrangement which impairs no competition and shifted the
responsibility to the legislation, such as the boycott
arrangement in Klor's.77 Nevertheless, in Taiwan the
approach of the rule of reason and the scope which this
approach can be applied to are provided for in the draft.
Since protection of free competition is the ultimate concern
of antitrust laws, an analysis based on competition effects
which cartel conduct may bring on is a more logical and
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appropriate test for determining the illegality of the
cartel conduct. Therefore, the rule of reason approach
adopted by the draft FTL is a better regulation for Taiwan.
Since the draft adopts the approval approach on a rule of
reason basis, the standards for the FTC to determine
approvals become significant. Two guides suggested by
Professor Sullivan may serve as the approval standards:
improving market and partial integration of functions which
may achieve significant economies of scale.
For those arrangements which may exceptionally be
allowed, the FTC ought to balance their effects on
competition with their improvementof the market or their
achievements of significant economies of scale for
determining their legality. If an arrangement aims to
improve the market and incidentally affects price, but does
not aim to fix price, it ought not to be illegal, for
example, those operation regulations of exchange market and
tobacco auction warehouse.78 Applying this theory to the
draft FTL, if the exceptional cartels increase efficiency or
unify standards and incidentally affect prices, they ought
to be legal; otherwise, if they aim at fixing price under
cover of promoting efficiency or unifying standards, they
ought to be illegal.
Similarly, the arrangements involving a partial
integration of functions may achieve significant economies
of scale, and inevitably lessen competition. Balancing the
extent of reduction in competition with the extent to which
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integration benefits may be obtained is necessary if and
only if the arrangements meet two conditions: first, the
price must arise inevitably from the integration; second,
the elimination of price competition must not appear to
significantly lessen market-wide competition. Consequently,
other exceptional cartels in the draft FTL, when meeting
these two conditions, should be analyzed by balancing
reduction of competition with the economy scale benefit
which they may bring in order to determine their legality.
In conclusion, the two objective standards of improving
the market and integration achieving economies of scale will
be suggested as the basis on which to determine the approval
of those exceptional cartels in the draft FTL. In addition,
as economic circumstances have changed so much and rapidly,
justifiable cartels other than the seven exceptional ones
will probably be formed in the future. To avoid their
escaping the regulation of the FTL, a clause to include
other situations with the same effect is suggested.
As for the method of approving the exceptional cartels,
the objection approach suggested by Professor Yen and
Professor Liang, which proposes to cancel the approval of
cartels and punish them when they abuse their market power
and affect the market, is inappropriate in two ways.79
First, cartel actions are themselves anticompetitive, and
thus impair not only the function of price and market, but
public interest. Cartels are justified by benefits which
they bring to the whole economy, which does not mean that
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the actions are legal themselves. To adopt an objective
approach amounts to recognizing their legality and to
encouraging enterprises to engage in anticompetitive
practices. As a result, the economy as a whole and the
public interest will eventually be seriously impaired.
Second, one of their reasons for adopting the objection
approach is the fear that uncertain standards of approval
will make it difficult for enterprises to follow the law or
predict the legality of their cartel practices.80 Since the
two suggested standards and the case load which will be
built up in the future will solve this problem, there is no
significant reason to adopt the objection approach.
Therefore, the approval approach is an appropriate one for
supervision of the exceptional cartel actions.
1. Draft FTL, Art. 14.
2. See Draft FTL, General Explanation for the Draft FTL.
3. Draft FTL, Art. 14.
4. Draft FTL, Art. 7.
5. Draft FTL, Art. 14.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Draft FTL, Art. 15.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Draft FTL, Explanation for the Art. 14.
12. Professor Liou critisized the scope of the excepted
concerted actions; Professor Yen and Professor Liang both
opposed the method of approving the excepted concertec
actions. Their opinions appear in the following text.
13. Liou, Comments on the Draft Fair Trade Law, at 10,
1987.(an Article presented in the Hearing for the Fair Trade
Law. )•
14. Id.
15. See Yen, A Review and Suqqestions for the Draft Fair
Trade Law, at 8-9, 1987.(an Article presented in the Hearing
for the Fair Trade Law.); Liang, Suqqestions for the Draft
Fair Trade Law, at 7, 1987.(an Article presented in the
Hearing for the Fair Trade Law.).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See Draft FTL, Art. 14; see also, Liu, The Fair Trade Law
Draft, East Asian Executive Reports 8, at 13 (July 1986).
20. L. Sullivan, Antitrust 198 (1987).
21. United States v. Socony-vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60
S.Ct. 811 (1940).
22. L. Sullivan, supra, at 198, and accompaning note.
23. Socony-vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223, 60 S.Ct. at 844.
24. See L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 200-10.
25. See id. at 200.
26. See id.at 200, 205-06.
27. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 38
S.Ct. 242 (1918).
28. 246 U.S. 231, at 236-38 (1918).
29. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
30. See v. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 205.
31. See id. note 2, 3, at 206 and accompaning texts.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 200.
34. See id. at 206-08.
35. See id. at 206.
36. See id at 206-08.
ENDNOTES 75
7637. United States v. Sealy, Inc.,388 U.S. 350, 87 S.Ct.
1847 (1967).
38. Id.
39. See ide
40. See Kiefer- Stewart v. Seagram, 340 U.S. 211, 71 S.Ct.
259 (1951) (quoting Socony-vacuum, Co., 310 U.S. 150, at
223).
41. 340 U.S. 211, at 213, 71 S.Ct. 259, at 260 (1951).
42. See L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 211.
43. See P. Ardee, Antitrust Analysis, problem, Text, Cases
317 (2d ed. 1974).
44. See L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 211-12.
45. See ide at 213.
46. United States v. Topoc Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 92
S.Ct.1126 (1972).
47. Id.
48. See id.; see also, L. Sullivan, supra note 20, discussion
at 216-18.
49. Topoc, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
50. L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 219-24.
51. The text which follows is based on Professor Sullivan's
theory of Characterization of horizontal market division
arrangements.
52. See L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 219-24.
53. See ide at 230.
54. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
79 S.Ct. 705 (1959).
55. Eastern Atates Retailers' Association v. United States,
234 U.S. 600, 34 F.Ct. 951 (1914).
56. Id. at 614, 34 F.Ct. at 955.
57. Fashion Originators' Guild of america v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457, 61 S.Ct. 703 (1941).
58. See L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 234.
59. Id. at 465, 61 S.Ct. at 707.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 467-68, 61 S.Ct. at 707.
62. See Joliet, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law:
American, German and Common Market Laws in Comparative
Perspective 49 (1967).
63. See ide at 50-51.
64. Klor's, 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705 (1959).
65. Id. at 211.
66. Id.
67. See Joliet, supra note 62, at 53; L. Sullivan, supra note
20, at 236.
68. See JOliet, supra note 62, at 53.
69. See J.t. Chadwell, Competition and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act - Instant Antitrust or Lonq-run policy, 27 ABA
Antitrust Section, 60, 65 (1965).
70. L. Sullivan, supra note 20, at 241.
71. Id. at 241-45.
7772. See ide at 241-42.
73. Cement Manufactures Protective Association v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 F.Ct. 586 (1925).
74 Id.
75. See infra p. 3.
76. There are seven justifications for cartel conduct in the
draft FTL. See Draft FTL, Art. 14.
77. See infra p.12-14.
78. See infra p.6 and accompaning note.
79. See infra p.3.
80. See ide
VI. VERTICAL CONCERTED ACTIONS
A. vert;ical Concert;ed Act;ions in t;he Draft; FTL
The only vertical restraint regulated by the draft FTL is
agreements which involve resale price maintenance. This is
because the legislature intended to regulate vertical
concerted actions loosely.l Article 18 of the draft FTL
makes null and void any agreement between a seller and its
buyer fixing the price at which the buyer may resell a
commodity. 2 Nevertheless, daily necessities for the general
consumer are excepted if there are goods of the same
category in free competition on the market.3
Professor Liou criticized such a regulation of resale
price maintenance in two ways.4 First, he states that an
agreement is not the only way for a seller to force its
buyer to fix resale price. There are other means by which
the seller may achieve the same purpose, such as
discriminating treatment and refusal to deal, thus merely
making void an agreement is not enough to prohibit resale
price maintenance practices.5 Therefore, Professor Liou
suggested a provision prohibiting enterprises from engaging
in actions which fix resale price. This provision would
replace the original agreement prohibition and provide
regulation for other forms of resale price maintenance.6
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Second, Professor Liou also criticized the exceptional
regulation of Article 18: which makes lawful a resale price
maintenance on daily necessities for the general consumer
when there are other similar goods available in the market.?
He first questioned why resale price fixing on consumers'
daily necessities should be allowed exceptional He thought
that the rationale underlying it was unpersuasive.8 Then he
illustrated the probable consequence of the exception and
concluded that there should be no exception for prohibiting
resale price fixing. He asserted that if exception is
allowed under the condition that there are goods of the same
category freely competing in the market, the manufacturer
would give the same commodity different brand names and
different resale prices to give a false impression of
competition. In addition, resale price maintenance impairs
consumers interest and retailer competition, and therefore,
no exceptions should be allowed.9
Although other types of vertical restraints are not
expressly regulated in the provisions of the draft, they may
still be prohibited through the application of Clause 6 of
Article 19 which prohibits enterprises from engaging in
activities which make a trade conditional on unduly
restricting the commercial activities of its trading
counterpart. 10
Professor Liou was not satisfied with the general and
ambigious regulation of the Clause 6. He thought it
actually indicated other types of vertical restraints of
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trade, such as tying arrangements, customer and territorial
restrictions, and exclusive dealing. These vertical
restraints are so popular and important in the course of
transactions that a general and ambiguous regulation on them
is inappropriate to the practices.II Moreover, the
consequences of these vertical restraints cannot be
determined without an analysis under the rule of reason;
they may have varied consequences, good or adverse economic
effects, in different situations.12 Therefore, Professor
Liou suggested that these vertical concerted actions should
be sepcific regulated in particular articles.13
To evaluate Professor Liou's comments on resale price
maintenance agreements and to supplement the ambiguous
regulation of other vertical concerted actions, a study of
vertical restraints in the U. S. is necessary.
B • Vertical Restraints in the u. s.
1. Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price fixing agreement or combination in the U. S.
is per se a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.14 This per se rule of resale price maintenance was
formulated in Albrecht v. The Herald Co ••IS
In Albrecht, the plaintiff, an independent newspaper
distributor, violated a resale price fixing agreement with
the newspaper publisher defendant and charged his customers
higher price than the fixed price. The defendant hired a
circulation sales company to solicit plaintiff's customers,
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and consequently one fourth of plaintiff's customers were
assigned to another distributor. Then the defendant
informed the plaintiff that he could have his customers back
if he charged the suggested price. The court indicated that
the defendant's conduct to force the plaintiff to conform to
the suggested prices was price fixing for the resale of the
defendant's newspaper and held that such a resale price
fixing per se constituted an illegal restraint of trade
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.16
The rationale for prohibition of resale price maintenance
is based on its economic effects. When the manufacturer
fixes the resale price, price competition among dealers is
ended. Consequently resale price fixing facilitates dealer
cartels or aids manufacturer cartels.1? In addition, it has
bad effects on two levels: on the dealer itself and on the
public customer. First, when the manufacturer sets a resale
price on his commodities, the dealers would likely face
unfair competition. For example, if one dealer is able to
make his resale price lower than others and thus attract
more customers because of his operating efficiency, the
resale price fixing restricts his ability to compete with
other dealers. On the other hand, if a dealer bears a
higher operating cost, such as higher rental cost or labor
cost resulting from locating in a city with a higher living
standard, the fixed resale price makes his competition with
other dealers unfair because of his higher cost. Thus,
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resale price fixing would likely result in unfair
competition among the retailers themselves.18
Second, and more importantly, the public benefit
resulting from free price competition among the retailers
would be impaired. When the resale price competes freely ,
some variation among dealer prices resulting from
differences in efficiency is reasonably expected, and thus
the customer can choose among the dealers and benefit from
the lower price. As a result, resale price fixing impairs
the public benefits of choice among the dealers and price
reduction from the efficient dealer.19
These bad ecnomic effects of resale price fixing forced
the Congress to repeal the states' power to authorize fair
trade pricing in 1975.20 In the 1930s, under pressure from
retail trade associations to prevent price cutting among
retailers marketing goods, state legislatures enacted fair
trade laws, which allowed resale price fixing agreements,
and made it unlawful to knowingly and willfully sell the
commodities at a lower price.21 In response, the Congress
passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the McGuire Act to
exempt certain types of resale price maintenance agreements
from the Sherman Act if they were otherwise valid under
state law.22 In 1975, a period of severe inflation led to
the Congress's repeal of the fair trade exemption.
Consequently, resale price maintenance falls within the
illegal per se rule without any exemption.23
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In addition to resale price fixing agreement, there are
other indirect means to achieve resale price maintenance.
Consignment arrangements and refusals to deal are two
significant examples.24
A consignment arrangement is a vertical transaction which
is a transfer, not a sale, of a product from a principal to
an agent for the purpose of arranging sales of the product
to third parties. Such a consignment arrangement may
involve sale price fixing by the principal; however, the
relationship between the two parties is a principal-agent
relationship rather than a manufacturer-retailer one.
Sale price fixing in consignment arrangements was held
lawful in the court's early view.25 This view was
established in United States v. General Elec. Co.26 in 1926.
In the G. E. case, the defendant, the manufacturer of a
patented light bulb, arranged the sale of the products
through some merchants at prices fixed by G. E., but
retained the title until the goods were sold. The court
thought that since the relationship between the defendant
and those merchants was one of principal and agent and the
control of sale as well as the risk of loss was on the
defendant, there was consequently no illegal resale price
maintenance involved.27 Therefore, the court held that such
sale price fixing in a consignment arrangement was not
invalid under the Sherman Act.28
Nevertheless, the court's view about consignment
arrangements has changed recently. A consignment
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arrangement which attempts to fix price will be held
invalid. 29 In SimDson v. Union Oil Co.,30 the court struck
down a consignment arrangement between a gasoline supplier
and a gasoline retailer which fixed a minimum price for the
sale of gasoline.31 There the defendant lessor refused to
renew the lease of a gasoline station because the plaintiff
lessee sold the gasoline consigned to him by the lessor at a
price below the fixed price in the consignment agreement.
By distinguishing the G. E. case tby the fact hat G. E.
involved a patented product, the court held that the
consignment agreement in Simpson was illegal under the
antitrust law.32 With this case, the court established a
rule that any coercion device used by a supplier on its
retail outlet to achieve resale price maintenance is illegal
per se.33
Three years later, the court in United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co.,34 once again confirmed the per se rule. In
Arnold, the court upheld a consignment arrangement between
the defendant bicycle manufacturer and its distributors to
establish vertical territorial and customer limitation on
the ground that the defendant consignor had not attempted to
fix prices. There the court further ruled that vertical
restraints as to territory or dealers are illegal per se if
the restrictions are ancillary to price fixing.35 Therefore,
any consignment arrangement which attempts to fix price,
with an effect identical resale price maintenance, is
illegal per se.36
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Refusal to deal is another significant means of
indirectly achieving the effect of resale price fixing. In
a refusal to deal situation, instead of asking the
wholesaler or the retailer to adhere to the sale price, the
manufacturer announces his price policy and refuses to deal
with retailers who do not follow his set resale price. Most
of the time, it will be followed by a combination between
the manufacturer and wholesalers or retailers which refuses
to sell the product to the offender.
In the early stage, focusing on the right of manufacturer
or trader to freely select the customer, the court announced
such refusal to deal to be lawful.37 In United States v.
Colaate & Co.,38 a soap and toilet article manufacturer
combined with his wholesale and retail dealers to engage in
resale price fixing by refusing to deal with the offending
dealer. The court held that refusal to deal conduct of a
manufacturer with the effect of resale price fixing did not
constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act as long
as there was no agreement obligating any dealer to resell at
the fixed price.39
However, this rule has been overruled, in effect, in
recent cases.40 For example, in United States v. Parke. Davis
Co, a case whose fact was similar to that of Colaate, a
pharmaceutical product manufacturer told its retailers not
to sell its product below the minimum price and otherwise
refused to deal with them, and informed its wholesalers that
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it would refuse to deal with them if they sold its product
to the offending retailers.
In Parke, the court indicated that a unilateral refusal
to sell to retailers who resell the product not to adhere to
the fixed price may be lawful, but is not the same as an
unlawful combination.41 The court thought that the
combination with wholesalers and retailers which was created
by defendant's practices went beyond a mere refusal to deal
with offending dealers. Accordingly, the court reasserted
the price restraint rule in Soconv-Vacuum: a combination
formed in pUrPOse and effect of raising, depressing, fixing
••• the price of a commodity in interstate commerce is
illegal per se.42 The court held defendant's refusal to deal
with the effect of resale price maintenance, even if there
was no agreement concerning price fixing, to be illegal.43
Also, in Albrecht v. Herald,44 a newspaper manufacturer's
refusal to deal with a distributor due to the distributor's
overcharging customers constituted a combination to fix
maximum prices, and thus was held an illegal restraint of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.45 Therefore, the
court's view on resale price maintenance by means of refusal
to deal is now that it is illegal per se.
2. Other Vertical Concerted Actions
In addition to resale price maintenance, there are other
vertical concerted actions in common commercial activities.
Most are due to the manufacturer's restraints in the
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distribution process or outlet, including customer and
territorial restriction and exclusive distribution.
Moreover, a special type of sale arrangement, the tying
arrangement, is another significant vertical concerted
conduct.
a. Customer and Territorial Restrictions and Exclusive
Dealing
The present law applied to other vertical restraints is
the rule of reason.46 This rule of reason approach was
formulated in the case of Continental T. v •• Inc. v. GTE
Svlvania. Inc.,47 where the Supreme Court held that all
nonprice vertical restrictions should be evaluated under the
rule of reason, no matter whether customer, territorial , or
location. 48
Before Continental T. v., cases were decided according to
the holding of United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co ••49 which
gave treatment differently according to the dealer's
identity; the per se rule would be applied to the wholesaler
who purchased and resold the commodity, and the rule of
reason would be applied to the wholesaler who was agent for
the manufacturer.50
In Continental T. v., the defendant, television set
manufacturer, arranged a location restriction which
prohibited its retailers from selling defendant's products
in areas other than the specified locations approved by the
defendant. Despite defendant's alleging the Arnold Schwinn
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rule, the court indicated that the per se rules of
illegality are appropriate only when the involved conduct is
manifestly anticompetitive.51 The court further announced
that the standard for determining application of the per se
rule or the rule of reason depends on whether the
restriction has a pernicious effect on competition and lacks
any redeeming virtue.52 Referring to the established
evidences, the court rejected the per se rule and held that
such a location restriction did not lack any redeeming
virtue, and therefore, should receive a rule of reason
analysis.53
The rationale underlying the decision of Continental T.
v. is based on an analysis of such vertical restrictions'
effect on both intrabrand and interbrand competition.
undoubtedly, such customer or territorial restrictions will
lessen, if not end, intrabrand competition since they help
dealers from encountering each other. However, the
efficiencies in product distribution achieved from such
restrictions may promote interbrand competition. The
promotion of interbrand competition constitutes a redeeming
virtue of the restriction.54 Therefore, all nonprice
vertical restrictions should receive an rule of reason
analysis to evaluate their effect on both intrabrand and
interbrand competition.
Like customer and territorial restrictions, exclusive
dealing, which means a contract in which the manufacturer
appoints a dealer as his sole or exclusive outlet in a
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specified area, is also subject to the rule of reason.55 In
general, despite its effect of eliminating intrabrand
competition, an exclusive dealing arrangement is legal
because a manufacturer has the right of choosing certain
buyers with whom he will deal.56 However, under the rule of
reason, if there is no interbrand competition, and thus
intrabrand competition becomes more important, then a
manufacturer's right of exclusive dealing may be accordingly
more restricted.
b. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is a sale arrangement in which the
seller refuses to sell a tying product, which is highly
desired by the buyer, unless the buyer also purchases a tied
product, which is a less desired product, such as business
machines (tying) and tabulating cards (tied) or a T. V.
antenna system (tying) and service contract(tied).57 The
seller usually uses tying arrangements to achieve(serve) at
least four purposes: first, using its market power in the
tying product to establish similar power in the tied
product; second, engaging in a form of price discrimination;
third, reducing distribution costs; and finally, protecting
the seller's goodwill in the tying product.58
The use of the seller's market power in one market to
obtain a better position in another market is considered
anticompetitive because it detracts from competition on the
merits in the tied product market. Thus, in general, such
tying arrangements are illegal under section 3 of the
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Clayton Act or illegal per se under section one of the
Sherman Act if the seller has sufficient economic power in
the tying product market and makes an appreciable restraint
upon competition in the tied product market.59 Moreover, a
tying arrangement may also be illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act on the basis of a rule of reason analysis even
though there is no sufficient market power or commercial
restraints involved.60
Accordingly, a tying arrangement is illegal per se when
it meets three criteria: separate products, sufficient
economic power, and a more than de minimis amount of
commerce. Usually, the issues on separate products
criterion are not hard to resolve. However, in some
situations it may be difficult to determine whether there
are two products tied together or whether ther is only one
product consisting of two components, thus allowing the
defendant to assert the one product defense and credibly
argue that the product is a single one. For example,
advertisement space in both a morning and an evening
newspaper are regarded as merely one product due to
commercial practicalities, but a prefabricated home and a
financing loan were held to be two separated products.61
In practice, a seller can engage in a tying arrangement
only if he has sufficient economic power in the market for
the tied product.62 There are several indicators for a
finding of sufficient economic power: the seller's market
monopoly or dominance in the tying product market; the
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seller's large number of tied sales without buyer advantage;
and the uniqueness of the seller's tying product.63
Sufficient economic power may result from a patent or
copyright monopoly or other form of market dominance. For
example, in International Salt Co. v. United States,64 the
patented salt machines were tied to the purchase of salt;65
in United States v. Loew's Inc.,66 the copyrighted films were
tied to the purchase of inferior films.67
Sufficient economic power may also be found when the
seller makes a large number of tied sales and there is no
buyer advantage, such as package price reduction. For
example, in Northern Pacific Railwav v. United States,68 the
Northern Pacific Railway sold the land on condition of the
purchase of shipping goods on the Northern Pacific Railway.
Relying on the evidence that the seller offered no buyer
advantage and made a large number of tied sales, the court
held that the defendant had sufficient economic power.69 In
United States Steel Core. v. Fortner Enterprises,70 the
Supreme Court further announced that the standard for
determining sufficient economic power is whether the seller
has the power to raise prices, or to impose such tie-in term
with respect to an appreciable number of buyers within the
market. 71
Generally, the seller will be held to have sufficient
economic power when his tying product is unique in the
market, such as the copyrighted feature films of Loew's in
United States v. Loew's Inc••72 However, even when his tying
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product is unique, the seller can be held not to have
sufficient economic power if the unique product provides the
seller no cost advantage over his competitors.73 In u. S.
Steel, the defendant offered unique no-interest loans to
developers who purchased its highly priced prefabricated
houses. The court thought that such credit terms did not
establish defendant's market power in the credit market, but
merely showed its willingness to accept a lesser profit, or
to incur greater risks.74 Thus the court held that lacking
any evidence to show the defendant had some cost advantage
over its competitors, the defendant's sufficient economic
power was not established.75
To make a tying arrangement illegal per se, the third
criterion, substantial amount of commerce involved, must be
met. A market share analysis in not required to satisfy
this requirement. usually the proof of a more than de
minimis dollar volume involved is sufficient.76 For example,
foreclosure of $500,000 in salt was sufficient commerce in
International Salt case; and even $60,800 was found not
insubstantial in the Loew's case.77 In addition, in u. S.
Steel, the court indicated that the relevant figure is the
total volume of sales tied by the sales policy, not the
amount of the particular plaintiff's sale.78
Therefore, a tying arrangement will receive a per se
illegal treatment if the seller has sufficient economic
power in the tying product market to appreciably restrain
competition in the tied product market, and a not
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insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is affected.
otherwise, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, it will be
examined under the rule of reason, on the basis of its
purpose and effects. However, there are some affirmative
defenses which may be alleged by the defendant, such as new
industry defense and protection of goodwill defense.79
New industry defense is a defense which indicates that
since defendant's new business with a highly uncertain
future, the tie is justified as necessary to assure proper
functioning of special equipment.BO This defense has
succeeded in some lower courts. For example, in United
Stated v. Jerrold Electronics,B! a cable T.V. antenna
manufacturer's tying arrangement which required installers
to purchase service contract to assure proper functioning of
the system was held legal. Nevertheless, the court
emphasized that it was legal at outset, not after business
had become established.B2
Protection of goodwill defense usually focuses on that
the tie is necessary to protect the seller's goodwill of
quality control.B3 This defense rarely succeeded because
less restrictive alternatives for such protection always
appeared available, for example, the manufacturer can
separate the products and give buyers opportunities to make
their own choices.B4
c. Sugges1:ions for 1:he Draf1: FTL
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Basically, the regulation in the draft FTL which makes a
resale price maintenance agreement null and void is
appropriate. It ends price competition among the retailers,
thus impairs free competition at the retailer level and
public benefits from price competition.
Truly, as Professor Liou indicated, there are some
concerted actions other than resale price maintenance
agreements that may indirectly have the effect of resale
price maintenance, such as consignment agreements and
refusal to deal.8S Nevertheless, interpretation of the term
resale price maintenance should not be too limited; it may
be broadly interpreted to include those actions which have
the same effect as resale price maintenance agreements.
Therefore, through broad interpretation, professor Liou's
proposal of replacing the term of resale price maintenance
"agreements" with the term of "actions" becomes unnecessary.
As for the exceptional commodities in the draft FTL
(daily necessities for the general consumer), the draft did
not provide any persuasive basis for such an exception. In
addition, any exception will lead the manufacturer to give
the same commodity different brand names, and thus escape
the regulation. Therefore, unless the Legislature can
further illustrate a outweighing economic effect for such an
exception, Professor Liou's proposal to delete the exception
is suggested. 86
Regulation of vertical concerted actions other than
resale price maintenance is a significant drawback of the
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draft FTL. It seems to ignor other vertical concerted
actions by regulating only resale price maintenance in
Article 18, but, on the other hand, it tries to regulate
them through the application of the general and ambigious
Clause 6 of Article 19, which prohibits transactions with an
unduly restrictive condition on the commercial activities of
the trading counterpart.a?
As Professor Liou pointed out, Clause 6 of Article 19
was intended to regulate other vertical concerted actions.aa
This regulation presents two drawbacks itself. First, these
vertical concerted actions other than resale price
maintenance (such as customer and territorial restrictions,
exclusive dealing, and tying arrangements) are so common and
significant in commercial practices that a general
regulation would overlook their importance in practice.
Second, these nonprice vertical restraints may result in
different economic effects, good or adverse, in different
situations, and thus should not be prohibited per se without
an analysis of their purpose and effect in different
situations. Consequently, the per se prohibition of
nonprice vertical restraints in the draft FTL is not only
inappropriate but is against the policy of the antitrust
l~.
To correct this oversight and to fill up the gap of
Clause 6 of Article 19, the introduced U. S. experience may
serve as a good reference. In the field of customer and
territorial restrictions and exclusive dealing, the rule of
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reason, an analysis of the restriction's effect on
competition, should be received. In general, the test is
based on balancing the effect of the restriction on
intrabrand competition and interbrand competition. If the
restriction promotes interbrand competition and thus
outweighs the effect of lessening intrabrand competition,
the restriction can be justified, otherwise, it should be
illegal.
In dealing with tying arrangements, the criteria of per
se illegality can be referred to. In U. s. antitrust laws,
a tying arrangement is illegal per se if the seller has
sufficient economic power in the tying product market to
make an appreciable restraint on competition in the tied
product market. Nevertheless, considering the different
economic situation and different economic policy in Taiwan,
the illegal per se elements should be loosely applied. A
proposal basing on the rule of reason is suggested: when the
per se illegality criteria in the U. s. laws are met, a rule
of reason should be applied to evaluate the effect of such
tying arrangements on the economy as a whole.
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VII. CONCLUSION
After many years' debate and anticipation, Taiwan's new
antitrust law, the Fair Trade Law, which is intended to
replace the outdated law and to regulate current economic
activities, has finally been drafted and submitted to the
legislature. Nevertheless, the above study shows that there
are significant drawbacks concerning ambiguous standards of
illegality and incomplete scope of regulations in the draft.
Maybe this is because the draft FTL is the first antitrust
law attempt in Taiwan and the government lacks experience or
relevant references to refer to. However, leaving these
drawbacks uncorrected will cause problems when this draft is
applied to real cases.
In the field of monopoly, The draft FTL's monopoly policy
prohibits monopolistic conduct but allows monopoly
structure. This policy is suitable for Taiwan because of
Taiwan's specific economic circumstances. Taiwan's economy
is primarily based on export-import trading, thus large
scale enterprises are necessary for raising its
competitiveness in the international economic market. In
addition, monopolies attained by natural methods or superior
skill are also allowed in the U. S. On the other hand,
monopolistic conduct is prohibited to prevent its
anticompetitive effect on
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Taiwan's market and economy. Therefore, the monopoly policy
in the draft FTL is basically appropriate.
Nevertheless, the criticisms rest on a lack of criteria
for monopolies and monopolization. The first suggestion for
monopoly standards is to define the market in product and
geographic terms. The U. S. experience in delineating
market, which is described in Chapter III, can be referred
to. Secondly, standards for measuring monopoly power should
be provided. Referring to the relevant U. S. cases, a
proposal which measures a firm's market power based
primarily on a certain percentage of its share in the market
and secondarily on market structure factors such as entry
barriers will be suggested.
The regulation requiring the authority to publicly
identify enterprises which are monopolies in structure
should be deleted. It is unrealistic to expect the
authority to investigate all enterprises in Taiwan to find
out which of them are monopolies in structure.
Monopolization should not be regulated by such ambiguous
terms as "unfair," "inappropriate," and "unjustifiable." A
general prohibition clause which prohibits any abuses of
monopoly power is suggested. As to the standard for
illegality of monopolization, the exclusionary conduct test
of the U. S. law which outlaws conduct identified as
exclusionary and harmful in the market is suggested.
In the field of mergers and combinations, the draft FTL
allows mergers for the sake of promoting efficiencies and
102
encouraging large scale enterprises, yet requires certain
highly concentrated enterprises to apply for permission for
mergers in order to supervise certain mergers which endanger
free competition. Such a merger policy declares a clear
merger test for enterprises and courts to anticipate and
follow and participate is better than the corresponding u.S.
regulation.
In the U.S., mergers are regulated by the use of the
flexible "rule of reason" and the amended Section 7 of the
Clayton Act which outlaws any mergers which may have the
effect of lessening competition or creating a monopoly.
Therefore, the U. s. legislation provide no clear standards
for illegality of mergers but leave this problem to the
court. Thus, a lack of predictability and certainty is the
most significant criticism of the u.S. antitrust laws.
Compared with the u.S. merger laws, the merger regulation
in the draft FTL provides a certain predictability and
certainty of merger regulation. However, it has been
criticized for the adopted permission approach for
supervision of mergers. The main drawback of the permission
approach is the possibility that the authority will delay
permission and thus cause damage to the merging firms.
Accordingly, a revised permission approach is suggested
which provides a time limitation for evaluation of applied
mergers.
The U.S. standards for illegality of mergers and
underlying policies can serve as a reference to supplement
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Taiwan's merger regulation. The standards in relevant areas
can provide a basis for the cost-benefit analysis of an
applied merger. For example, the criteria of creating
market power and lessening competition for horizontal
merger; foreclosure and market entry barriers for vertical
merger; reciprocity and entrenchment for conglomerate
merger.
Horizontal concerted actions are basically prohibited in
the draft FTL, but can be allowed exceptionally if they
benefit the economy as a whole and are permitted by the
authority after application in advance. While there are two
justifications, market improving and partial integration of
functions achieving significant economies of scale, which
are available in the U. S. laws, there are seven
justifications for horizontal concerted actions in the draft
FTL. The reason for the broader scope of justifications in
the draft FTL is that Taiwan's economic policy encourages
promotion of efficiencies to achieve large scale enterprises
and to raise competitiveness in the international market.
As a result, if a horizontal concerted action's benefit to
the economy as a whole outweighs its cost of impairing free
competition, it should be justified.
The regulation of vertical concerted actions is the most
significant drawback in the draft FTL. The draft FTL
regulates only resale price maintenance in Article 18 with
the intent of ignoring other vertical concerted actions.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, it ambiguously reserves the
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regulation of vertical concerted actions other than resale
price maintenance by Clause 6 of Article 19 which prohibits
transactions which place undue restrictions on the
commercial activities of the trading counterpart.
There are several common vertical concerted actions other
than resale price maintenance in the course of commercial
activities , which have significant influence in the market.
Customer and territorial restrictions, exclusive dealing,
and tying arrangements are significant examples. The draft
FTL's silence on these nonprice vertical restraints ignores
their importance of them in social commercial activities,
and will cause problems in the future. When these practices
take place, there will be no law to regulate them.
If the draft FTL intended to regulate these nonprice
vertical restraint practices by applying Clause 6 of Article
19, a per se prohibition, it oversimplifies the problems.
These nonprice vertical restraints may result in different
economic effects, good or bad, in different situations. For
example, these practices may promote interbrand competition
in the market through the received advantages when they
lessen intrabrand competition. Therefore, a treatment of
per se prohibition for all these nonprice vertical
restraints without a cost-benefit analysis will damage
social commercial activities and contradict Taiwan
government's economic policy.
Therefore, specific articles which regulate vertical
concerted actions are recommend for addition to the draft
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FTL. The standards for evaluating them are based on a cost-
benefit analysis, an analysis which balances the restraints'
effect on intrabrand competition with the effect on
interbrand competition in the market.
Due to the draft FTL's significant drawbacks, as
described above, it is foreseeable that the enforcement of
the draft FTL and decisions of the court will encounter
certain difficulties in practice. perhaps as Senator Lin
has said in the legislature, since the Fair Trade Law
legislation has been delayed too long, the most significant
step now is to enact an antitrust law for Taiwan, not to
make it perfect. However, this thesis is intended not only
to provide a reference for Taiwan's authorities and courts,
but also to make suggestions for further revision of the
Fair Trade Law.
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